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THE IMPACTS OF ALTERNATIVE ELECTRIC RATE STRUCTURES FOR IRRIGATION
CLAY-UNION AND UNION RECs
Donald

c.

by
Taylor and Ardelle A. Lundeen

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this research report. the impacts of alternative electric rates and
rate structures for irrigation for the Clay-Union and Union rural electric
cooperatives (RECs) are evaluated. Consideration is given to both different
levels and different forms of electric rate charges.
The alternative electric rate structures are evaluated in terms of the
behavior of managers of hypothetical farms designed to represent "typical"
irrigator clients served by the two RECs.
A linear programming model was
developed to portray as fully as possible the technical. institutional. and
economic features associated with each representative farm.
The managers of the representative farms are presupposed to be able to
make short-term farm enterprise and irrigation adjustments. as well as longterm changes in their irrigation technologies. in response to pre-season
declared changes in electric rate structures for irrigation by REC electric
power suppliers. The farm enterprise and irrigation technology adjustments
considered are the use or non-use of two already-present electric power. high
pressure center pivots; the conversion of the already-present center pivots
to low pressure and/or diesel power; the purchase of new irrigation systems
for use on dryland; water distribution by center pivot sprinklers or gated
pipe. surface-irrigation. gravity flows; the irrigation of crops with greater
or lesser irrigation requirements than corn; full versus partial irrigation
rates; and the renting of additional irrigated and/or non-irrigated land.
The reference point in the linear programming analysis of the representative farms is the 1985 electric rate structure for irrigation in the two
RECs.
For the Clay-Union REC. the rate structure involves (1) an annual
minimum - charge per irrigation system of $17.80 per average kilowatt (kW)
used. (2) a monthly demand charge of $9.00 per peak kW used during each
monthly billing period when an irrigation system is operated. (3) a two-step
energy charge. involving 4.2 cents per kilowatt hour (kWh) for the first 100
kWh per average kW per season and 2.6 cents per kWh for all additional kWh.
and (4) a load management control option. If the load management option is
elected. the monthly demand charges are waived. If the load management option is rejected. a 1.1 cent per kWh credit is received by the irrigator.
The Union REC rate structure is similar. except that the annual minimum
charge is assessed against nameplate horsepower (HP) rather than against
average kWs used and at a rate of $15.40 per HP.
The study's "baseline solutions" involve the modeling of each representative farm with its actual electric rate structure for 1985 under four different situations: irrigators with debt- versus equity-financed new irrigation equipment (to see the impacts of financial leveraging on irrigator behavior) and with 1985 versus 1980 crop prices (to see the impacts of
different commodity price levels on irrigator behavior). Attention is given

to expected electric power revenues received by RECs and levels of farm
income earned by irrigators with normal precipitation. as well as the
estimated range in year-to-year revenue/income associated with unusually
heavy and light precipitati9n.
A series of electric rates and rate structures differing from those in
1985 is examined through linear programming analysis as follows: (1)
electric energy (kWh) charges both lesser and greater than those assessed in
1985. which enables the estimation of derived demand functions for electric
power to pump irrigation water. (2) greater and lesser "fixed" up-front annual minimum and monthly demand and variable energy (kWh) charges. and (3)
differently configured energy (kWh) block rates. namely. single-step. threestep declining. and three-step increasing block rates. Since an examination
of the incentives for irrigators to select the load management control option
doesn't lend itself to linear programming analysis. this aspect of the study
is evaluated via simple budgeting procedures.
Major findings

The most important results from the study are summarized as follows.
1. In all eight baseline solutions for the two representative farms.
irrigated crop production is profitable. The irrigation systems. ranging in
number from two to six per farm. are all electrically powered. All newly
purchased irrigation systems involve either low pressure (Clay-Union REC service area) or gated pipe (Union REC service area) irrigation water distribution.
Corn is consistently the most common irrigated crop although. in some
situations. irrigated soybeans are also profitable. Partial irrigation and
rented irrigated land are not profitable in any of the solutions.
2. The impacts of 7% to 38% higher crop prices in 1980 than in 1985 are
very substantial. These impacts include greatly increased irrigator profits
($59.000 to $78.000 per irrigator in the baseline solutions). considerably
higher direct price elasticities of demand for electricity to pump irrigation
water in the upper price ranges of the kWh energy charges. and more extensive
irrigation.
3. The impacts of unusual precipitation on RECs are expectedly the opposite of those on irrigators. With the baseline solutions. for example. unusually heavy precipitation results in a $330 to $440 reduction (7% to 10%)
in REC electric power revenue per irrigator but a $3.600 to $26.400 increase
in irrigator profits. With unusually light precipitation. on the other hand.
REC electric power revenues per irrigator are $375 to $500 more. and irrigator profits are $9.500 to $54.000 less. This outcome arises primarily
because of a much greater impact of unusual precipitation on irrigators'
dryland crop yields and income than on their irrigation electric power
payments.
4. In
several important respects. rational economic behavior by
leveraged irrigators with debt-financed irrigation equipment is quite different from that by irrigators with equity-financed irrigation equipment.
For example. irrigators with equity-financed new irrigation equipment generally are more responsive in power use to changes in kWh energy charges in the
higher
range
of
electricity
prices
than are their debt-financing
2

counterparts.
Further.
their
incomes are much less susceptible to
fluctuation when unusual precipitation occurs than are the incomes of their
debt-financing counterparts.
~

5. The direct price elasticities of demand for electricity to pump irrigation water for various segments on the estimated demand functions range
from being very inelastic (considerably less than -1.00) at "low" electricity
prices to being very elastic (between -1.62 and -12.00) at "high" electricity
prices.
The 1985 baseline average variable energy charges per kWh of
electricity rest within the most inelastic segments of the 20 estimated
demand functions. With an increase from the 1985 rates of as little as 1 to
3 cents per kWh. however. irrigators in a majority of the situations examined
would have economic incentive to cut back on the level of electricity that
they use in pumping irrigation water. Electricity prices would have to rise
from 7 to 34 cents per kWh. however. before "typical" irrigators would totally stop using electric power to energize their irrigation systems (with
diesel fuel at $0.97 per gallon).
6. The cross demand elasticities for irrigation water (in response to
different electric power rates) are much lower than the direct price elasticities of demand for electricity to pump irrigation water. This outcome
arises because. as electric power rates increase. diesel powered irrigation
systems replace part of the electric powered systems.
7. The
"fixed"
cost
electric
power
components [plant-related
"facilities" and wholesale monthly demand electric power (kW) charges] comprise between 75% and 80% of the total electricity costs for pumping irrigation water.
Because of the need for capital assets to eventually be
replaced. the relative importance of "fixed" costs does not generally diminish over time. The variable energy (kWh) charges constitute the remaining
20% to 25% of the total electricity costs for irrigation pumping.
8. A possible Clay-Union and Union REC pricing policy to reduce by 75%
the annual minimum or monthly demand electric rates. while holding the energy
(kWh) charge the same. shows prospects for:
Either no change or some increase in the amounts of irrigation
water pumped and electric power used for pumping irrigation water;
A 20% to 30% reduction in REC irrigation power revenue: and
An increase of $1 0 800 to $3 0 550 in the return to labor and management for individual irrigator customers.

9. The impacts of modified energy (kWh) block rates on irrigation
electric power and water usage are relatively limited. As long as the 1985
"fixed" up-front electric rate components are retained in the rate structure.
the impacts of the single-step. three-step declining. and three-step increasing block rates examined (rather than the 1985 two-step declining block rate)
on energy and water usage are 1% or less.
10. When the "fixed" up-front electric rate charges are set at zero.
more sizeable impacts of modified energy (kWh) block rates on irrigation
energy and water use are experienced. The impacts do not conform to a single
3

pattern, however, as might be hypothesized on the basis of micro production
theory (all other things the same).
For example, common patterns of
increased energy and/or water usage are not associated with more strongly
graduated declining block~ rates (than in the 1985 baseline electric rate
structure).
Neither are common patterns of decreased energy and/or water
usage associated with the three-step increasing energy (kWh) block rate
charges.
11. Irrigators who follow the Clay-Union and Union REC load management
control program, and do not thereby sustain yield losses, clearly derive
economic benefits from the load management option. If only very modest yield
losses ( < 2% of normal) would be sustained from following load management,
however, irrigators should not follow the load management program.
The Clay-Union and Union REC load management control option provides opportunity for irrigators to voluntarily withdraw from the program at any time
they so desire.
Results of analysis show that irrigators would be welladvised economically to enter and stay under the load management program as
long as irrigation system power interruptions do not create yield-reducing
moisture-stress for irrigated crops. For every billing month that irrigators
do so, they can avail themselves of waived monthly demand charges. If such
stress conditions do arise, however, irrigators would be well-advised to inr
mediately opt out of the load management program, continue to pump irrigation
water, and be no worse off economically during that billing month than their
all-season load management non-follower counterparts.
Iaplications of findings to electric rate pricing policies
These findings have at least three direct implications to electric rate
pricing policies.
1. Current electric rates fall within the most inelastic segments of
the estimated direct price demand functions for electricity to pump irrigation water. Increases in the variable energy charge of as little as 1 to 3
cents per kWh would likely lead to some reductions from baseline levels in
electric power use by irrigators. Variable energy charge increases of as
much as 7 to 34 cents per kWh would have to take place, however, before most
current electric power irrigators would totally shift away from electric to
diesel power sources (with diesel fuel at $0.97 per gallon).
2. The short-run implications of unusual precipitation on REC revenues
are expectedly the opposite of those on irrigator profits. If the negative
impacts on irrigators from drought are great enough to force the irrigators
out of business, however, both the irrigators and their "parent" RECs stand
to lose. Thus, a rate structure that provides for the sharing of risks between RECs and irrigators from unusual precipitation can be expected to be in
the best long-term economic interests of both irrigators and RECs.
Two features of the current Clay-Union and Union REC electric rate
structures for irrigation provide for the sharing of risks between irrigators
and RECs during seasons of unusual precipitation. The spreading of the
"fixed" up-front costs over fewer kWhs results in higher average costs per
kWh in years of unusually heavy precipitation (and hence limited irrigation
pumping).
The two-stepped declining energy (kWh) block rate also results in

4

higher
average variable energy (kWh) costs with heavy precipitation.
Conversely. when precipitation during an irrigation season is unusually
light. both features contribute to a below normal overall average cost per
kWh for the electric power µsed by an irrigator.
3. Load management programs to control peak power demands are of
definite increasing interest in South Dakota. The central features that make
the Clay-Union and Union REC load management option attractive to irrigators
are (1) the potential for irrigators to avoid paying monthly demand charges
in any month during whi ch 20 hour per day irrigation is adequate to meet the
moisture needs of their crops and (2) the possibility for load management
followers to opt out of the load management control program (with no greater
penalty than to pay the monthly demand charge) whenever they determine that
20 hour per day irrigation would result in yield-reducing moisture-stress.
This double-barreled feature of the program contributes to the mutual
economic welfare of both the electric power supplier and the electric power
user.

5

INTRODUCTION
This is the third in a series of five Economics Department reports on a
research
project.
"The ~ Economic Impact of Alternative Electric Rate
Structures
on Energy and Water Use". sponsored by the South Dakota
Agricultural Experiment Station. Supplemental funding for the research was
provided by the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). Golden. Colorado.
The purpose of this third report is to present the empirical results
from the study of different electric rates and rate structures for irrigation
for the Clay-Union and Union rural electric cooperatives (RECs) in southeastern South Dakota. As a prelude to the presentation of results. abbreviated
descriptions of the overall electric rate structure-irrigation research
project and the Clay-Union and Union REC representative farm models used in
the research are provided.
The initially presented results--termed the "baseline solutions"--are
based on the modeling of the representative farms with the actual electric
rate structures for irrigation used in 1985 by the Clay-Union and Union RECs.
The next group of results shows the impacts of variable energy [kilowatt hour
= kWh] charges that are both lower and higher than those assessed in 1985 on
the prospective demands for electric power and water for irrigation. The
results for three types of alternative rate structure analysis are then
presented.
These involve greater and
lesser "fixed" up-front and variable
energy charges. differently configured energy (kWh) block rates. and load
management controls. The impacts of unusually heavy and light precipitation
on REC power sales and revenues and irrigator profits are also covered.
The other reports in this research report series are as follows:
- No. 1. Enterprise Budgets and Other Data-Sets; Electric Rate
Structure-Irrigation Study; Clay-Union. Union. Cherry-Todd.
and Cam-Wal RECs;
- No. 2. Mixed Integer Linear Programming Model; Electric Rate
Structure-Irrigation Study; Clay-Union. Union. Cherry-Todd.
and Cam-Wal RECs;
- No. 4. The Impacts of Alternative Electric Rate Structures for
Irrigation. Cherry-Todd REC; and
- No. 5. The Impacts of Alternative Electric Rate Structures for
Irrigation. Cam-Wal REC.
A rather "casual" reader can expect to find this third report to stand on its
own.
Readers with a more serious interest in the empirical findings in this
report. however. will find it helpful to consult Reports 1 and 2 for detailed
information on the data-sets and modeling used in the study. Where linkages
between this and the other reports are particularly strong. references are
made parenthetically to pertinent sections from the prior reports.
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OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH
About
80%
of South Dakota's irrigation pumps are energized by
electricity.
The high cpst and under-utilization of recently developed
(coal-based) electric power generation facilities have resulted in increased
wholesale costs of electric power and. in turn. in higher electric rates for
irrigators and other electric power consumers. Operating within an already
financially-stressed agriculture. RECs that supply electricity to irrigators
are exploring possible revisions to rate structures offering prospect of more
fully meeting the joint needs of themselves and their irrigator clients.
The research results reported in this publication show the impacts of
alternative electric rates and rate structures on (1) the demands for power
to energize irrigation pumps and for irrigation water and (2) expected levels
of irrigator farm income and REC electric power revenue. Included in the
analysis is special attention to different levels of commodity prices. debtversus equity-financed irrigation equipment. and both average income/revenue
levels and the estimated range in year-to-year income/revenue associated with
unusually heavy and light precipitation.
What represents a "most appropriate" electric rate structure for irrigation for one REC power supplier may not be "most appropriate" for another. A
host of rather location-specific factors determines what is "most appropriate".
These factors include (1) average amounts of and year-to-year
variations in precipitation and solar radiation (as these impact amounts of
irrigation water that must be pumped). (2) the lift and source of pumped
• water. (3) the nature of soils and topography. (4) the spectrum of potentially profitable farm enterprises. (5) the internal financial structure of an
REC. (6) the importance of irrigation relative to other sectors in an REC's
power sales. and (7) the philosophic positions of an REC's manager and
governing board. Taking into account the first four factors. study sites in
four different South Dakota RECs were selected for separate study and
analysis. In selecting the RECs and study sites within their respective service areas. efforts were made to cover as wide a range as possible of conditions for each of the four factors.
The study sites for the four selected RECs and a brief description of
their attributes. relative to the four selection criteria. are as follows
(for more details. see pp 3-6 and Figures 1 and 2 in Report 1):
Clay-Union REC. irrigated area east
50 in Clay County.

of Vermillion and south of Route

*Precipitation--relatively high and stable from year to year.
*Pump lift--shallow ground water (about 25 ft of lift is common).
*Soils--light and low-lying. and
*Farm
enterprises--mainly corn and soybeans.
farrowing-finishing. small grains. and alfalfa as well;

but

some

hog

- Union REC. irrigated area primarily east of Elk Point and just west of
the Big Sioux River. but also extending along the north side of Route 29
north of Elk Point to Route so.
7

*Precipitation and pump lift--similar to the Clay-Union REC,
*Soils--heavy. with some areas having
raphy to permit gated pipe i rrigation. and

sufficiently flat topog-

*Farm enterprises--similar to the Clay-Union REC..
fewer hog enterprises and more limited alfalfa production;
Cherry-Todd REC, irrigated area south of
Francis and Olsonville in Todd County.

except for

a line roughly between St.

*Precipitation--limited,
*Pump lift--deep ground water (about 130 ft of lift is common),
*Soils--light, sandy. well-drained to excessively drained, and
*Farm enterprises--somewhat narrow range, with
terprises. corn. alfalfa. and oats being most common; and
Cam-Wal REC, irrigated area south of Mobridge
Missouri River in Walworth County,

cow-calf

en-

and just east of the

*Precipitation--lowest of the study sites.
*Pump . lift--higb lift from the Missouri River. with about 150 ft
of lift for the "low-lands" research site and 300 ft of lift for the "bluffs"
research site,
*Soils--generally heavy. with an undulating
precludes "low pressure" water distribution, and

topography. which

*Farm enterprises--cow-calf operations and the widest range of
crops for any study site, including corn, alfalfa, small grains, and annual
forages (corn silage. sorghum sudan pasture).
In this report, the results from the study for the Clay-Union and Union
REC are presented. In Reports 4 and s. the results for the Cherry-Todd and
Cam-Wal RECs are presented. Subsequent publications will cover more generalized findings based on the results for all four RECs. In those publications.
the interactions between alternative electric rate structures and the contrasting irrigation environments represented in the four REC service areas
will be stressed.
REPRESENTATIVE FARM MODEL ANALYSIS
To accomplish the purpose of the research, a hypothetical farm was identified to represent "typical" irrigator clients served by each REC. A linear
programming model was developed to portray as fully as possible the technical. institutional. and economic features associated with each representative
farm (for a detailed description of the model, see Report 2).
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Nature and role of representative f aras in the research
The representative farm models are intended to reflect conditions on
typical irrigated farms wit h above-average management in the Clay-Union and
Union REC service areas in 1985. Irrigator farm managers are presupposed to
be able to make short-term farm enterprise and irrigation adjustments in
response to pre-season declared changes in electric rates and rate structures
for irrigation by REC electric power suppliers. They are also presupposed to
be able to make changes in irrigation technology (e.g •• downgrading irrigation water distribution pressures. shifting from electric to diesel power
sources. purchasing new irrigation systems) which have long-term im.p lications
to farm resource use. Thus. while the models involve only a single production period. a longer term (7 to 15 years) decision-·making planning horizon
is envisioned for the managers of the representative farms.
The representative farms are assumed to already be in operation--with
specified acreages of land (260 and 440 acres. respectively. of irrigated and
non-irrigated cropland for both RECs and an additional 100 acres of pasture
for the Clay-Union REC) and generally adequate machinery and equipment. farm
buildings. and breeding herds (only for the Clay-Union REC representative
farm) to make economic use of the land. The available machinery and equipment includes two electric power. high pressure center pivot systems (for
more details on the assumed availability of resources and the constraints on
resource use for the representative farms. see pp 19-20 and Tables 25 and 26
in Report 1 and pp 7-8 in Report 2).
Electric rate structures

~BSJined

In 1985. the electric rate structures for irrigation for both the
Clay-Union and Union RECs contained provisions for annual minimum. monthly
demand. and two-step declining block rate charges. along with a load management control option. The rate structures are based on annual cost of service
studies. as explained in the appendix to this report.
The specific provisions of the Clay-Union REC electric rate structure
are as follows:
Annual minimum charge:

$17.80 per average kilowatt (kW) used;

Monthly demand charge:
$9.00 per peak kW used during each monthly
billing period when an irrigation svstem is operated:
- Energy charges:

* First-step. $0.042 per kilowatt hour (kWh) for the first 100 kWh
per average kW per season; and

*

Second-step. $0.026 per kWh for all additional kWh;

Load management control. in which the monthly demand charges are
dropped in exchange for an agreement by an irrigator for power to his (her)
irrigation systems to be turned off from 5 to 9 pm daily during one or more
months of the irrigation season; and
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No load management control. in which irrigation svstems are ener2ized
without daily interruptions. monthlv demand charger are Paid. and a $0.011
oer kWh (Basin) credit is received by the irrigator.
4

The Union REC in 1985 had the same rate structure as the Clav-Union
REC did. except that the annual minimum charge was assesse~ against nameolate
horsepower (HP) rather than against average kW's used and at a rate of
$15.40 per HP.
The "baseline" electric rate structures used in the study are the justdescribed rate structures for 1985 for the two RECs. A series of electric
rates and rate structures differing from those in 1985 was then examined. as
follows:
Estimated demand for electric power to pump irrigation water. with
electric energy (per kWh) charges both lesser and greater than those assessed
in 1985;
Greater and lesser "fixed" up-front (annual minimum
demand) 4nd variable energy electric rate charges; and

and monthly

Differently configured block rates. namely. single-step, three-step
declining, and three-step increasing energy (kWh) block rates (in contrast to
the 1985 two-step declining rate).
Using the linear programming model. "optimal solutions" for the representative farms with the 1985 electric rate structures were first determined.
The results of this analysis show the most profitable farm enterprises and
irrigation technologies. the amounts of electric power use and electric power
revenue for irrigation pumping, and the return to operator labor and management for each representative farm situation. Most profitable farm plans were
then determined for each of the just-described electric rate and rate structure alternatives. The conclusions of the study for all alternatives except
those involving load management are based on a comparison of the farm organization, energy use. electric power revenue, and irrigated farm profit
features of these various plans. Since an examination of the incentives for
irrigators to select the load management control option doesn't lend itself
to linear programming analysis, this aspect of the study was evaluated via
simple budgeting procedures.

1The two suppliers of electric power to the East River Electric Power
Cooperative--which in turn supplies electric power to the Clay-Union and
Union RECs in South Dakota--are the Western Area Power Authority (WAPA) and
the Basin Electric Power Cooperative~ During 1985 and 1986, Basin- Electric
granted a $0.02 per kWh credit on all electric power used for irrigation.
This credit was passed "down the line" to irrigators. The impact of the
Basin credit on irrigators served by the East River Electric Power
Cooperative is $0.011 per kWh. The irrigator credit is less than $0.02 per
kWh because some of the electric power supplied to East River is from WAPA.
2The average kW demand in the Clay-Union REC is reported to be about 85% of
the nameplate- HP rating for the p~er unit.
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Irrigation alternatives considered
Several options are open to irrigators in responding to different
electric rates and rate strµ ctures. In the study of electric rate structures
for irrigation in the Clay-Union and Union RECs. seven irrigation alternatives were considered. The alternatives -and the underlying rationale for including each in the study are as follows (for added detail covering these alternatives. see pp 14-16 and Tables 15. 16. and 19 of Report 1 and pp 8-11 of
Report 2).
The uae or nOD-Wle of two alreacly-present. electric poser. high
pressure [a pivot pressure of about 75 pounds per square inch (psi)] center
pivot•.
A:n important practical question is whether energy prices are so
high (relative to commodity price levels) that farmers should no longer use
irrigation systems already present on their farms.
One objective of the
analysis. then. is to determine how high electric power rates can rise before
it becomes uneconomic So use electrically powered pumps to lift and distribute irrigation water.
The coDYersion of already-present center pivot• to low pressure and/or
diesel power. In response to rising electric power rates. irrigators may
find it economic to convert their existing irrigation systems to low pressure
(in the Clay-Union and Union REC service areas. to about 30 psi) and/or to
diesel power sources. The economic question is whether prospective energy
savings from low pressure water distribution and/or diesel power will more
than offset the annualized costs of converting existing equipment from high
to low pressure and/or from electric to diesel energy sources. The representative farm analysis is structured so as to enable a determination of how
high electric rates can rise before it becomes economic to downgrade water
distribution pressures and/or give up electricity in favor of diesel power
for energizing irrigation pumps.
The purchase of uev irrigation systeas. A:n important practical question is whether electric energy-commodity price and other relationships are
such that farmers can afford to expand the area they irrigate through the
purchase and use on existing dryland of new irrigation systems. Provision is
made in the model for the purchase of several types of irrigation systems.
including electric and diesel powered center pivot and gated pipe (the latter
for the Union REC only) units.
Water distribution by center pivot sprinltlers or gated pipe. surfaceirrigation. gravity flows. In part of the Union REC service area. soils
and topography permit gated pipe. gravity flow water distribution. With
gated pipe irrigation systems. the energy pumping costs per acre-inch of
water are much less than with sprinkler systems. Counterbalanced against
this are larger amounts of irrigation water and irrigation labor that are
required with gated pipe than with center pivot irrigation. The representative farm analysis was structured so as to determine whether investments in
new center pivot sprinkler systems and/or new gated pipe systems (the latter
only in the Union REC service area) would be economic.
3unless the already-present electrically powered center pivot systems are
converted to diesel power (see the next para), the model requires the payment
of the annual minimum charges no matter whether the systems are used or not.
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The
irrigation
of crops with a greater or lesser irrigation
requireaent than corn. The most commonly irrigated crop in the Clay-Union
and Union REC service areas is corn.
Soybeans are also grown under irrigation -in both areas. and i p Clay County· alfalfa is as well. The irrigation
requirement for alfalfa is 7CJI. more than that for corn. The irrigation
requirement for soybeans. on the other hand. is slightly less (2-4%) than
that for corn. With higher or lower electricity prices for energizing irrigation pumps and different commodity prices. it is conceivable that the
relative economics of producing crops with different intensities of irrigation water application could shift.
Full veraus partial irrigation water application rates. One of the
potential adjustments to rising energy prices is to irrigate at a level less
than that which meets the full consumptive water requirement of a crop. In
the Clay-Union and Union REC representative farm models. two levels of partial irrigation. namely. two-thirds and one-third the full application rate.
were permitted. Based on a "textbook" soil moisture-yield production function. yields and production costs were adjusted to correspond with the
reduced irrigation levels. The analysis of this option involved determining
whether. as electric power rates increase. the reduced pumping and other
production costs associated with partial (rather than full) irrigation would
be great enough to compensate for the consequent crop yield losses.
The renting of additional irrigated land. The final irrigation alternative considered involved determining whether the economics of irrigated
crop production with some of the electric rate structure scenarios are suf ficiently favorable to justify renting a quart~r-section (130 irrigated acres)
already serviced with a center pivot system.
This alternative is analagous
to the irrigation system purchase option. except that this option involves
renting rather than purchasing assets and a combined land and irrigation system expansion rather than simply an irrigation system expansion.
Purchasing new irrigation equipaent with debt- ver8118 equity-capital
Irrigation systems represent multi-period inputs. In economic analysis.
the investments required for purchasing them need to be spread out (i.e ••
amortized) over a number of years.
Two types of amortization can be
undertaken.
A "financial" type of amortization pertains to debt-financed purchases.
The most commonly reported method for debt-financed irrigation system
purchases in South Dakota is via a lease-purchase program involving an
4 Provision was also made in the model for renting up to a quarter-section
of dryland. The rationale for including the land rental options was to
determine the economic feasibility of a possible expansion of irrigation
with reduced energy prices and/or increased commodity prices.
A potential limitation in this approach concerns the drawing of conclusions
for the macro REC service area (which serves only a fixed land area) based
on the analysis of a typical representative farm that is given the option to
rent neighboring land. The fact that only dryland is rented in the optimal
solutions for both REC representative farms reduces considerably the actual
impact of this potential limitation.
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initial downpayment (15.5% of the purchase price). six annual payments (15.7%
each). and a terminal "buy-out" payment (10%). The debt repayment for
converting electric power systems to diesel power is commonly amortized over
four years. whereas the smaller investments for converting from high to low
pressure water distribution are commonly amortized over two years.
An "economic" type of amortization reflects a longer-te.rm. equitycapital (i.e •• farmer-owned capital or savings). economic-profit perspective
in which no attention is paid to debt repayment terms. The number of years
and interest rate used in this type of amortization reflect a long-term opportunity cost investment perspective of the decision-maker. In this study.
the "economic" amortization of investment costs was assumed to extend over 15
years.

Primarily because of a shorter amortization period (7 versus 15 years).
but also because of the somewhat higher interest rate implicit in the leasepurchase terms. the annualized "financial" costs of investing in new irrigation systems in the Clay-Union and Union REC service areas are considerably
higher (1.5 times as much) -than the corresponding annualized "economic" costs
(for more detail. see pp 15-16 and Tables 15 in Report 1). 5 These substantial cost differences imply that the most rational behavior of irrigators who
purchase new irrigation equipment with equity-capital may be quite different
from that for irrigators who have to meet the schedule of debt-repayments associated with recently or newly purchased irrigation equipment financed by
debt-capital.
Collaodity price assuaptions

The farm enterprise budgets used in analysis were developed using 1985
input prices. insurance rates. custom rates. wage rates. and capital costs.
In most of the alternative electric rate and rate structure scenarios. 1985
commodity prices were also used. To obtain some idea of the impact of different levels of commodity prices. however. in part of the analysis 1980
rather than 1985 crop prices were used. The 1980 prices were higher than
those in 1985 0 ranging in "real" (inflation-adjusted) 1985 terms from being
7% higher for alfalfa to 38% higher for soybeans (Table 1 0 Report 1).
The commodity prices used in analysis reflect actual market prices for
South Dakota as reported by the South Dakota Agricultural Statistical Service
and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. It was decided to use actual-market
prices rather-than government program deficiency or loan payment prices because only those irrigators with established acreage and yield bases are
eligible to participate in government grain commodity programs. Further. not
all irrigators with established acreage and yield bases necessarily participate in government programs. Also. the provisions in government programs
in one year frequently differ from those in other years. Since there is no
5The annualized "financial" ownership costs represent the present value of
the series of payments to meet the terms of the lease-purchase agreement-expressed on an annual basis. The annualized "economic" ownership costs
represent the present value of a series of payments amortized over 15 years
at 11% interest to offset the purchase price of irrigation systems. The
payment factors for the annualized "economic" and "financial" ownership
costs are 0.14 and 0.21. respectively.
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"typical" type of irrigator participation in government programs. our
analysis did not reflect participation by irrigators in the 1985 government
grain commodity program. Those irrigators with established acreage and yield
bases who participated in the government program in 1985. howgver. did
receive higher grain prices than those used in the study's analysis.

Gross profit •axi•ization
Solving the linear program representative farm models involved selecting
the combination of crop and livestock production enterprises and irrigation
technologies that would maximize the farm's "gross profits". where "gross
profits" are defined as the surplus of gross revenues over the variable costs
of farm production. The variable costs of farm production are those which
could be avoided if production were to be stopped. These include out-ofpocket production costs (e.g., for fertilizer. tractor fuel, land rent) and
the annualized costs of newly purchased irrigation equipment.
In the results presented in this report. the gross profits determined in
the optimal computer-determined solutions for the representative farms were
adjusted down to cover the costs of the assumed already-present resources on
the farms.
The annualized costs associated with the already-present land.
farm machinery and equipment. and livestock-related resources for the
Clay-Union and Union REC representative farms are $89 0 000 and $80.000.
respectively (see p 20 and Table 26 of Report 1 and pp 6 and 7 of Report 2
for added detail). The resulting "net profit" thereby calculated represents
the return to the irrigator's labor and management.

Unusual precipitation
In years of unusually heavy precipitation. farmers pump less irrigation
water. Other things the same. this impacts REC irrigation revenues negatively. and irrigator profits positively. In years of unusually light precipitation. the implications are the converse.
Examining the impacts on REC
revenues and irrigator profits of unusually heavy and light precipitation is.
therefore. one analytic focal point in the study.
The mean May-September precipitation level over the past 31 years at the
Vermillion weather· station--which serves as the precipitation reference point
for the Clay-Union and Union REC service areas--is 14.3 inches. To determine
pertinent levels of unusually heavy and unusually light precipitation to use
in analysis. the yearly May-September precipitation amounts were arrayed from
smallest to largest. The general procedure for all RECs was to identify an
amount exceeded in no more than one to three years out of the 30-34 years for
which data were available and to term that an "unusually heavy precipitation"

6The per-bushel deficiency payments received in 1985 by Clay and Union
County participants in the government feed grain program were as follows:
corn $0.48 0 oats $0.29. and wheat $1.08. The acreage set-aside requirements
in 1985 were 10% for corn and oats and 30% for wheat.
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level. 7
An analagous procedure was followed to determine the "unusually
light precipitation" level. Resulting from the application of this general
procedure was the identification of 20.0 and 8.6 inches to represent
May-September unusually he ~vy and light precipitation. respectively. for the
Cl.ay--Union and Union REC service areas.
It was assumed in analysis that representative farm managers had already
made their farm organizational plans and planted their crops based on normally expected precipitation. Selected most profitable solutions for the representative farms which were based on normally expected precipitation. thus.
became the reference point for examining the impacts of unusually heavy and
light precipitation. The examination was via partial budgeting. with joint
attention to:
The reduced (increased) irrigation system (a) pumping and (b) repair
and maintenance costs resulting from reduced (increased) irrigation water application rates;
The increased (reduced) dryland crop yields; and
The increased (reduced) costs of drying and storing the increased
(reduced) dryland crop production output associated with unusually heavy
(light) precipitation (see pp 13-14 and Tables 11 and 12 in Report 1 for
added detail).
BASELINE SOLUTIONS
The "baseline solutions" involve the modeling of the representative
farms with the actual electric rate structures for irrigation used by the
Clay-Union and Union RECs in 1985 under two different types of situations:
irrigators with -debt- versus equity-financed new irrigation equipment and
with 1985 versus 1980 farm commodity prices.
Features common to all eight
baseline solutions are first noted. Attention is then given to contrasting
results. in turn. for the Union versus Clay-Union REC representative farms.
irrigators with debt- versus equity-financed - new irrigation equipment. and
1980 versus 1985 commodity prices.
Comllon features

In all eight baseline solutions for the two representative farms (Tables
1 and 2). irrigated crop production is profitable. The irrigation systems.
ranging in number from two to six per farm. are all electrically powered.
All newly purchased irrigation systems involve either low pressure center
pivot (Clay-Union REC service area) or gated pipe (Union REC service area)
irrigation water distribution.
Corn is consistently the most profitable
crop. although in some situations soybeans are also profitable.

7The years Of available precipitation data for the different reference
point weather stations in the study ranged from 30 to 34. The unusually
heavy and light precipitation levels were determined in relation to natural
break-points among the one to three years of both heaviest and lightest
annual precipitation.
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Table 1.

Baseline solutions. Clay-Union and Union REC representative farms. irrigators with debt- versus
equity-financed new irrigation equiment. 1985 commodity pricesa.

Clay-Union REC
DebtEquityfinancing
financing

Union REC
DebtEquityfinancing
financing

Resource acquisition.
New irrigation systems purchased
Existing center pivots converted
Dryland rented (acres)

0
0
160

156

Irrigated production
Corn (acres)

260 CP-HP

520 CP-LP

0
260
92.040

130 CP-LP
650
216.155

_Q_
420
148.680

404
165
11
20
.600

0
142
44
20
206

290
150
0
0
440

40

40

0

Soybeans (acres)
Total acres
Total value of production ($)
.....Dryland production , (acres)
Corn
Soybeans
Alfalfa
Oats
Total

°'

Hog farrowing-finishing (brood sows)
Electric power used for irrigation
Total cost ($)
Total kWh
Average cost per kWh (cents)
Irrigation water used (acre-feet)
Return to operator labor and
management ($)

6.243
82.053
7.6
238

5.370

3 CP-LP

2 CP-LP

8. 122
109.353

1 GP
0
160

{'260 CP-HP
L160 GP

6.874
72.555

3 GP
2 CP-LP
160

)260 CP-LP
l320 GR
1..2.Q GP
740
244. 795

0
120
0

_o_
120
0

5.820
70.119
8.3

8.0

9.5

594

365

743

-10.885

-2.240

9.680

aThe names of different irrigation systems are abbreviated as follows: CP = center pivot (electric power). HP=
high pressure. LP = low pressure. and GP = gated pipe.

Tabie 2.

Baseline solutions. Clay-Union and Union REC representative farms. irrigators with debt- versus
equity-financed new irrigation equipment. 1980 crop pricesa

Resource acquisition
New irrigation systems purchased
Existing center pivots converted
Dryland rented (acres)
Irrigated production
Corn (acres)
Soybeans (acres)
Total acres
Total value of production ($)

...........

Dryland production (acres)
Corn
Soybeans
Alfalfa
Oats
Total
Hog farrowing-finishing (brood sows)

Clay-Union REC
DebtEquityfinancing
financing

Union REC
DebtEquityfinancing
financing

3CP-LP
0
160

4CP-LP
2 CP-LP
160

3 GP
2 CP-LP
160

3 GP
2 CP-LP
160

130 CP-LP

l260 CP-LP
480 GP

[260
CP-LP
320 GP

740
325.230

160 Gf
740
309.210

260 CP-HP

l2Q CP-LP
650
246.620

650 CP-LP
780
277. 720

21
165
4
20
210

0
56
4
20
80

0
120
0
0
120

0
120
0
0
120

40

40

0

0

Electric power used for irrigation
Total cost ($)
Total kWh
Average cost per kWh (cents)

12. 232
146.706
8.3

11.663
129. 708
9.0

Irrigation water used (acre-feet)

589

704

Return to operator labor and
management ($)

_o

64.315

77 .400

5.827
70.566
8.3
749
67.570

5.820
70.119
8.3
743
66.368

aThe names of different irrigation systems are abbreviated as follows: CP = center pivot (electric power). HP=
high pressure. LP = low pressure. and GP = gated pipe.

Partial irrigation and rented irrigated land are not profitable in any
of the solutions. Rented dryland, however, is profitable in all eight solutions, and in seven of the . solutions the maximum permitted area of 160 acres
is rented. These results indicate that, under the assumed conditions, farmers can not afford to pay a premium for land serviced with center pivot irrigation systems of as much as $35 per acre (the assumed irrigated and
dryland rental rates were $100 and $65 per acre, respectively).
Union ver•WI Clay-Union REC.

The extent of irrigation--judged by both the acre-feet of irrigation
water applied in all four contrasting model situations and the irrigated
acreage in three of the four situations--is greater for the Union than the
Clay-Union REC representative farm, especially with 1985 commodity prices.
The extent of electric power use for irrigation, however, is less for the
Union than the Clay-Union REC farms.
These outcomes arise primarily because the newly purchased irrigation
systems for the Clay-Union REC farm all involve relatively energy-intensive
center pivots (albeit low pressure units), whereas the newly purchased irrigation systems for the Union REC farm all involve irrigation waterintensive gated pipe units. Gated pipe irrigation does require heavier rates
of irrigation water application.
It is enough less energy intensive,
however, that the efficiency of electric power use for the Union REC farm is
considerably higher than that for the Clay-Union REC farm. A further explanation for the lesser electric power usage on the Union REC farm is a
25-30% lower irrigation water application requirement for crops irrigated in
the Union versus the Clay-Union REC study areas.
For the Clay-Union REC farm, the maximum number of 40 brood sows in the
hog farrowing-finishing enterprise is one component of all four most
profitable baseline solutions. Hogs were not considered with the Union REC
farm.
Rew irrigation equipaent purchased with debt- versus equity-capital

In only one of the four baseline solutions involving debt-financing do
the relatively high annualized costs of purchasing new irrigation equipment
effectively fail to constrain the expansion of irrigation. This exceptional
situation involves the Union REC farm with 1980 crop prices--in which three
new gated pipe systems are purchased and the two high pressure center pivots
are converted to low pressure. The relatively attractive crop prices of 1980
and the relatively favorable economics of gated pipe irrigation more than
compensate for the relatively high cost of debt-financed new irrigation
equipment. Because the opportunities for expanding irrigation are essentially exhausted in the Union REC solution involving debt-financed new irrigation
equipment, the solution involving the lower cost equity-financed new irrigation equipment differs little from it.
With 1985 commodity prices, a substantial expansion in irrigation (namely, the addition of two or three more irrigation systems) is economic for
only irrigators with equity-capital (but not with debt-capital) to finance
irrigation
equipment.
Both representative farm irrigators with
new
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equity-irrigation equipment use more than twice the amount of irrigation
water than their counterparts who use debt-capital to finance new irrigation
equipment.
The corresponding differential for the Clay-Union REC farm with
1980 prices is 20%. Irrigai ors with equity-financed new irrigation equipment
also grow more soybeans under irrigation than their debt-financing counterparts do.
1980 versus 1985 commodity prices

The impacts of 7% to 38% higher crop prices in 1980 on the optimal representative farm solutions, especially for the Clay-Union REC farm, are very
substantial.
Perhaps most importantly, the returns to operator labor and
management are no longer negative or only modestly positive. The extent of
increase in returns ranges from $59,000 to $78,000 for the four contrasting
baseline solutions.
The value of total irrigated crop production with the 1980 crop prices
is 1.3 to 2.7 times as much as with 1985 commodity prices. This increase
reflects most importantly the direct impacts of the crop price increases, but
also in three of the four contrasting situations an expanded irrigated area
(from one to three additional irrigated systems with 1980 crop prices). In
those three situations, from roughly 1.2 to 2.5 times as much irrigation
water is pumped as with the 1985 prices.
In two respects, the responses to the higher 1980 commodity prices differ on the two representative farms. In each case, the Clay-Union REC farm
shows responsiveness and the Union REC farm does not. The total kilowatt
hours of electric power used for irrigation is roughly 1.2 to 1.8 times more
with 1980 than 1985 crop prices for the Clay-Union representative farm--which
reflects the purchase and use of three to four additional low pressure center
pivot systems on that farm. The Clay-Union REC farm also responds to the
relatively greater increase in soybean - (38%) than in corn (24%) prices in
1980, through having three to four more center pivots of soybeans in its
solutions with 1980 than 1985 commodity prices.
UNUSUALLY HEAVY OR LIGHT VERSUS NORMAL PRECIPITATION
In the part of the analysis described now, the impacts on the baseline
models of unexpected precipitation during the irrigation season are examined.
Farmers are assumed to have (1) based their farm plans on normal precipitation levels, (2) planted their crops in the spring, and (3) followed fertilization, plant protection, and other cultural practices in accordance with
expected yields based on normal precipitation.
As the crop season unfolds,
however, precipitation is assumed to depart from the normal and to be either
unusually heavy (reaching a level experienced during only 3 to 10 years out
of 100 yea9s) or unusually light (again, a 3 to 10 out of a 100 year
occurrence).
This is presumed to result in reduced (increased) irrigation
requirements for irrigated crops and higher (lower) yields for dryland crops.
8This reflects the one to three year cut-off points for unusually heavy and
light precipitation that were identified relative to the 30-34 years of
available precipitation data for the reference point weather stations in the
study.
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For each representative farm with 1985 commodity prices and for both the
debt-· and equity-financed new irrigation equipment situations, the impacts of
unusual precipitation on the amount of irrigation water pumped, the amount of
electricity used for pumping irrigation water, the irrigation power revenues
received by RECs (which, of course, also represent electric energy costs for
irrigation to irrigators), and the return to operator labor and management
were determined (Figures 1 and 2). The middle histogram-bars in the figures
reflect outcomes with normal precipitation; these are termed 100%-level outcomes.
The left histogram-bars reflect outcomes with unusually heavy
precipitation, and the right bars outcomes with unusually light precipitation.
The percentages shown at the top of the left and right bars indicate
the unusually heavy and light precipitation outcome values relative to the
respective normal precipitation outcomes.
The findings from this analysis are described first for the unusually
heavy precipitation situation and then for the unusually light precipitation
situation. Because most of the results differ rather markedly for irrigators
with debt- versus equity-financed new irrigation equipment, special attention
is given to this dimension in the findings. In instances where the findings
for the two REC representative farms differ, the name of the REC farm to
which a finding pertains is shown parenthetically.
With unusually heavy precipitation, the decreases in the acre-feet of
irrigation water pumped and the kWh of electricity for pumping irrigation
water range from 26% (Clay-Union} to 36% (Union).
REC irrigation power
revenues decrease by $330 to -$440 per irrigator, which translate into the
following percentage decreases: 5% (Clay-Union) and 6% (Union debt-financing
irrigators) or 15% (Union equity-financing irrigators). The impacts of unusually heavy precipitation on the return to irrigator labor and management
are much greater. The increased return to irrigators using debt-capital to
finance the purchase of new irrigation equipment ranges from $16,800 (Union)
to $26,400 (Clay-Union).
For equity-financing irrigators, the increases
range from $3,600 {Union) to $6,000 (Clay-Union); these differences are less
because
of fewer dryland acres in the equity-financing optimal farm
solutions.
With unusually light precipitation, opposite and somewhat greater impacts· on irrigation water and electric power usage, REC revenues, and irrigator profits are realized. The greatest differences are in regard to irrigator profits. The decreases in the return to irrigator labor and management for the Clay-Union REC farm solutions from light precipitation are more
than double the corresponding increases from unusually heavy precipitation.
Analagous differences for the Union REC farm solutions are substantially
greater (involving 3.7- and 4.5-fold rather than 2-fold differences). These
outcomes reflect rather modest dryland yield increases from unusually heavy
precipitation and more substantial dryland yield decreases from unusually
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light precipitation. 9
Irrigators with equity-financed new irrigation equipment pump from 2.0
(Union) to 2.5 (Clay-Uni9n) times as much irrigation water as those with
debt-financed equipment. - They also experience a much less unstable return to
their labor and management when unusual precipitation is experienced. This
outcome reflects the much larger acreages of dryland crops in the baseline
solutions for irrigators who finance the purchase of new irrigation equipment
with debt-capital.
The power usage and REC revenues for irrigators with debt- versus
equity-financed irrigation equipment differ between the two REC farms. The
Clay-Union REC equity-financing irrigator uses one-third more electric power
for pumping irrigation water than his(her) debt-financing counterpart. The
analagous difference for the Union REC farm is 3% less. The Clay-Union REC
receives about 40% greater electric power revenues from equity-financing than
debt-financing irrigators, whereas the Union REC receives 17% to 30% lower
revenues from its equity-financing irrigators.
As noted above, the impacts of unusual precipitation on irrigator
profits are very substantial. These impacts originate from four sources, as
indicated in Tables 3 and 4 for the Clay-Union and Union REC representative
farms, respectively. The main finding from this analysis is that the change
in electric power payments for irrigation associated with unusual precipitation is relatively small. By far the dominant influence on irrigator profits
is that which arises rom the impact of unusual precipitation on changes in
dryland crop yields. 10 For example, the changes in dryland crop production
values for the Clay-Union REC farm are roughly 10 to 160 times as great as
the changes in the electric power payments for irrigation. For the Union REC
farm, the corresponding "crop production-electric power" cost-multiple is 6
to 100 times.
The ranges in irrigator profits associated with unusually heavy versus
unusually light precipitation are much greater for irrigators with debtfinanced (Clay-Union $80,550: Union $57,295) than equity-financed (Clay-Union
$18,195: Union - $12,985) new irrigation equipment.
This outcome arises because of fewer dryland crop acres in the equity-financing optimal solutions,
and the greater economic volatility generally associated with greater
leveraging.
These findings expectedly show the short-term impacts of unusual
precipitation on RECs to be the opposite of those on irrigators. If the
negative impacts on irrigators from drought are great enough to force irriga9rn terms of a "textbook" soil moisture-yield production function, this
involves movement from the "normal" soil moisture-yield point along the
production function (1) with heavy precipitation toward the function's
maximum versus (2) with light precipitation toward the function's inflection
point. The slope of the production function toward its maximum is, of
course, shallower than toward its inflection point.
lOS.ince crop irrigation
.
·
.
.
.
d in
. accor d ance wit
. h the
requirements
were a d JUSte

atnounts of unusually heavy and light precipitation, irrigated crop yields
were assumed to be constant across the three precipitation levels considered
in the study.
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Table 3.

Sources of impact of unusual precipitation on irrigator profits. Clay-Union REC representative farm
1985 baseline solutions. irrigators with debt- versus equity-financed new irrigation equipment.

Source of change in profits
Irrigators with debt-financed
new irrigation equipment
Dryland crop
production value
Irrigation system
repair and maintenance
Electric power
payment for irrigation
Grain storage and
drying
N
Total
+"Irrigators with equity-financed
new irrigation equipment
Dryland crop
production value
Irrigation system
repair and maintenance
Electric power
payment for irrigation
Grain storage and
drying
Total
8

Change in return to irrigator
labor and management
associated with unusually
heavy precipitation
Ratio to electric
Dollars power payment changea

I _ +29,3731 I 89.o I
+
+

459

I

330

I

Change in return to irrigator
labor and management
associated with unusually
ligh1 precipitation
Ratio to electric
Dollars
power payment changea

-60.848

161.4

1.4

-

524

1.4

1.0

-

377

1.0

- 3.762
+26.400

n/a
80.0

+ 7 ,597
-54.152

143 .6

+ 4.693

10.6

-11.142

22.1

+ 1.125

2.6

- 1. 286

2.6

+

441

1.0

-

504

1.0

292
+ 5.967

n/a
13.5

+
702
-12.230

~

-IJ.1..§.

24.3

These are the ratios of the changes in profits for the respective sources of profit change to the change in
the electric power payment for irrigation. e.g •• 29.373 i 330 = 89.0 (see the encircled data in the table).

~

Table 4.

Sources of impact of unusual precipitati on on irrigator profits. Union REC representative farm 1985
baseline solutions. irrigators with debt- versus equity-financed new irrigation equipment.
Change in return to irrigator
labor and management
associated with unusually
heavy precipitation
Ratio to electric
Dollars power payment changea

Source of change in profits
Irrigators with debt-financed new
ir r igation equipment
Dryland crop
production value
Irrigation system
repair and maintenance
Electric power
payment for irrigation
Grain storage and
drying
N
Total
\JI
Irrigators with equity-financed new
irrigation equipment
Dryland crop
production value
Irrigation system
repair and maintenance
Electric power
payment for irrigation
Grain storage and
drying
Total

I

+ls,140

I [A3:8-J

Change in return to irrigator
labor and management
associated with unusually
~ight pre~ipitation

Dollars

-45,014

Ratio to electric
a
Power payment change

104.2

+

604

1.5

-

625

1.4

+

I 414 I

1.0

-

432

1.0

- 2,355
+16.803

n/a
40.6

+ 5 .581
-40.490

n/a
93.7

+ 2,467

6.2

- 8.635

20.4

+

851

2.1

879

2.1

+

399

1.0

423

1.0

149
+ 3 .568

n/a
8.9

+
521
- 9.416

_m_
22.3

aThese are the ratios of the changes in profits for the respective profit-sources to the change in the
electric power payment for irrigation. e.g., 18,140 ~ 414 = 43.8 (see the encircled data in the table).

tors out of business, however, both the irrigators and their "parent" RECs
stand to lose. Thus, a rate structure that provides for the sharing of risks
between RECs and irrigators under circumstances of unusual precipitation can
be expected to be in the be ~ t long-term economic interests of both irrigators
and RECs.
Two features of the current Clay-Union and Union REC electric rate
structures for irrigation provide for the sharing of risks between irrigators
and RECs during seasons of unusual precipitation. The spreading of the
"fixed" up-front costs over fewer kWhs results in higher average costs per
kWh in years of unusually heavy precipitation (and hence limited irrigation
pumping).
The two-stepped declining energy (kWh) block rate also results in
higher
average variable energy (kWh) costs with heavy precipitation.
Conversely, when precipitation during an irrigation season is unusually
light, both features contribute to a below normal overall average cost per
kWh for the electric power used by an irrigator.

26

THE ESTIMATED DEMANDS FOR ELECTRIC

P~ER

AND WATER FOR IRRIGATION

In this section, the impacts of different prices per kWh of electricity
on (1) the quantities of ~lectricity used to pump irrigation water and (2)
the quantities of irrigation water pumped are presented. For each representative farm situation examined, a series of optimal solutions was determined.
The basic reference point for pricing electricity in the models is the 1985
electric rate structure for each REC. To simplify the interpretation of the
results of analysis, however, a single- rather than double-step kWh energy
charge is used.
In each of the 10 situations examined for each REC farm, starting with a
price of 1 cent per kWh, the price of electricity was raised successively by
1 cent per kWh increments--with all other prices and technological coefficients held the same--until the use of electric power to pump irrigation
water became uneconomic. Changes in production enterprises, irrigation technologies, quantities of electric power used for pumping irrigation water, and
quantities of irrigation water pumped-- as the kWh energy charge is raised-were determined.
Figures 3 and 4 reflect the price of electricity-quantity of electric
power· results and Figures 5 and 6 feflect the price of electricity-quantity
of pumped irrigation water results. 1
In economic terms, the first series of
functional relationships is termed the estimated "direct price demand functions for electricity" and the second is termed the estimated "cross price
demand functions for irrigation water".
These demand functions are stepped, as is characteristic of any derived
demand function estimated with a linear programming model. The dotted portions in the functions represent non-empirically estimated segments between
the respective pairs of one cent energy charges for which the empirical estimations were made.
Because the kilowatt hour prices are specified in the model runs in integer values and the irrigation crop production activities are specified in
the models in 130 acre (for center pivot systems) or 160 acre (for gated pipe
systems) units, many of the steps and vertical segments in the estimated
demand functions for the individual irrigated farms are rather long. The
steps involve changes in the numbers of irrigation systems, the types of irrigation technologies (namely. high or low pressure center pivot or gated
pipe water distribution), and the crops irrigated in the most profitable rep-

11 The figures are presented later in the report--immediately after the
points in the text at which the empirical findings portrayed in them are
first discussed.
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resentative farm solutions with different kWh energy costs. 12
The real-world aggregate demand functions for all irrigators served by
any one REC are much smoother (i.e •• more continuous) than the functions
reported in Figures 3-6. They are smoother because the economic be havior of
every irrigator is not identical and because some irrigators .hav e non-130
acre center pivot fields and non-160 acre gated pipe fields. Neve rtheless,
it is common practice in applied economic analysis to assume that t he general
shape of demand functions estimated from the analysis of "typical" individual
farms is a reasonable proxy for the general shape of the aggrega te demand
functions for the real-world situation being examined.
A total of 10 derived demand functions was estimated for each REC representative farm.
Ten functions. rather than one, were estimated so as to
reflect a variety of different circumstances that either apply in fact or
could conceivably apply to different irrigators served by the RECs at one or
more points in time. These different circumstances are now briefly noted.
along with the pairs of analagous panels in the figures that are compared in
drawing conclusions concerning the respective sets of circumstances:
i. Irrigators
with
debt- ver•us equity-financed ·new irrigation
equipaent:
Panels •a• versus "b•. Panels •c• versus •d•. Panels
•e• versus "f". and Panels "g" versus "h":
ii. 1985 versus 1980 comaodity prices, to reflect the impact of different levels of commodity prices on the demands for electric power and irrigation water [the 1980 prices which are 7% to 38% higher than the 1985
prices reflect more closely than the 1985 cash market prices (otherwise assumed in the study) the level of prices effectively received by participants
in the 1985 government grain commodity program]: Panels "a" versus "c".
Panels "b" versus "d". Panels "e" versus "g". Panels "f" versus
"h". and Panels "i" versus "j":
111.
With versus without aonthly demand charges. to reflect the
demands for · electric power and irrigation water represented by irrigators who
do not follow the load management control program versus those who follow the
program in all five months of the irrigation season (and therefore do not pay
the monthly demand charges in any of the five months): Panels "a" versus
"e". Panels "b" versus "f". Panels "c" versus "g". and Panels "d"
versus "h": and

iv. With versus without annual a1ll1llUa and aonthly demand charges. to
reflect the impact of a possible structural change in the electric rate
structure in which the "fixed" up-front charges would be eliminated and
electricity payments would be exclusively via an energy (kWh) charge: Panels
"a" versus "i" and Panels "c" versus "j".
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12 To illustrate, see Panel "a" from Figure 4 which is
reproduced to the right. The number and nature (GP =
gated pipe. CP = center pivot, HP = high pressure, and
LP = low pressure) of irrigation systems (all involving
irrigated corn production) are shown for the optimal
solutions associated with each vertical segment (single
point) in the derived demand function.
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In this section, an overview of the results for the 20 estimated demand
functions is first provided. Contrasts in the results between the Clay-Union
and Union REC representative farms are then presented, followed by the
contrasts represented in eaf h of the above four circumstances.

direct
Estimated
irrigation water

price

deaand

functions

for

electricity

to

puap

In

describing the demand functions in Figures 3 and 4, attention is
given to (1) the "endpoints" of the functions,· i.e., the amounts of electric
power used when (a) electricity is priced at 1 cent per kWh versus (b) the
price of electricity is high enough that pumping with water electric power
just becomes uneconomic and (2) the direct price elasticities of demand for
electricity to pump irrigation water.
The direct price elasticities of
demand reflect percentage changes in the quantity of electricity used as
ratios to corresponding percentage changes in the price of electricity.
Because of the discrete nature of the functions, "arc elasticities" were calculated over specified segments of the demand functions. The pertinent price
ranges and estimated elasticities for each demand function are shown in the
inset for each panel in the two figures.
Also noted in the insets are the average "variable" energy charges per
kWh (termed ''B/L kWh costs") in the respective baseline solutions that are
analagous to the kWh · costs reflected in the respective estimated demand functions.
In the panels ("i" and "j") which involve "without" annual minimum (AM) and monthly demand (MD) charges, the AM and MD charges in the
baseline solutions are allocated· across kWhs--in addition· to the nominal
energy (kWh) charges.
By noting the "location" of the average "B/L kWh
costs" on the respective demand functions, one can envision the expected type
of response by irrigators to possible changes from the 1985 levels for the
kWh energy charge.

AD overview of the findings. The maximum amounts of electricity used
for pumping irrigation water (at the lowest electricity prices) range from
about 60,000 to 170,000 kWh per irrigator. In eight of the 20 situations examined, these maximum amounts exceed the amounts of power use in the respective baseline solutions.
In the 16 model-runs intended to roughly portray the various conditions
different irrigators served in 1985 by the two RECs (Panels "•" through
"h" in each figure), the price per kWh at which electrically powered irrigation systems are no longer economic ranges from 9 to 36 cents. The 1985
baseline average variable costs per kWh of electricity (over and above the
"fixed" up-front charges) are less than·2 cents per kWh. The results, therefore, show that--with diesel power priced at $0.97 · per gallon--electricity
costs would have to rise considerably before "typical" irrigators would totally stop using electric power to energize their irrigation systems.
of

The numbers of steps in the estimated demand functions range from two to
six. The direct price elasticities of demand for electricity to pump irrigation water for various segments of the estimated demand functions range from
being very inelastic (considerably less than -1.00) at "low" electricity
prices to being very elastic (between -1.62 and -12.00) at "high" electricity
prices. These elasticity differences have important implications in the
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baseline rates and ( b) "debt- financing" and " e quit y- financing" mean irrigators who finance

new irrigation equi pment with debt- and equity-capi tal, respectively.
2.

The "p r ice range" and " Ep" inserts show the "direct price elasticities o f demand for

elec tri city to pump irrigation water" ( E) fur various kWh energy c har ges (c per kWh).
The "B / L kWh cost" is the average va riab~e energy charge per kWh in the r espective basel i ne solutions that is a nalagous to the kWh cost reflected in the respective es timated
demand func tions.
Figure 3. Es timated direct pr ice demand functions for electricity to pump irrigation water, ClayUnion REC repr esen tative farm.
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consideration of electric rate policies by RECs. If electric rates are
increased over price ranges involving inelastic demand. total electric power
revenues can be expected to increase. Conversely. if electric rates are increased over price ranges involving elastic demand. total electric power
revenues can be expected to~ decline.
The 1985 baseline average variable energy charges per kWh of electricity
rest withf~ the most inelastic segments of each of the 20 - estimated demand
functions.
The results of this analysis show that with an increase from
the 1985 rates of as little as 1 to 3 cents per kWh. however. irrigators in a
majority of the situations examined would have economic incentive to cut back
on the level of electricity that they use in pumping irrigation water.
Union ver8118 Clay-Union RBCs. For all ten comparisons. the quantity
of electric power used for pumping irrigation water at the lowest electricity
prices is greater with the Clay-Union than the Union REC representative farm.
The quantity differential ranges -from roughly 10 0 000 kWh to nearly 70 0 000 kWh
per irrigator. Key explanations are the (1) lighter· soils and hence 35% to
40% greater crop irrigation requirement and (2) the infeasibility of gated
pipe irrigation in the Clay-Union REC study area.
The price at which the use of electricity to energize irrigation pumps
becomes uneconomic. on the other hand. is always lower for the Clay-Union REC
farm. The "maximum price" differential between the two RECs ranges from 2 to
19 cents per kWh.
This outcome arises because the less energy-intensive
gated pipe systems in the Union (but not Clay-Union) REC service area are
less vulnerable to higher electricity prices than -are the pressurized center
pivot sprinkler systems in the Clay-Union REC service area.
The direct price elasticities of demand for electricity to pump irrigation water are generally somewhat higher for Union REC irrigators than for
Clay-Union REC irrigators.
A main underlying reason is the existence of the
added-gated pipe option in the Union REC service area.
Irrigators who use debt- ver8118 equity-capital to finance nev irrigation equipment. At "low" electricity prices. there is no simple pattern of
irrigators with debt-financed new irrigation equipment using either more or
less
electricity than their equity-financing counterparts.
At "high"
electricity prices for seven of the eight paired comparisons. however. the
price at which the use of electricity to energize irrigation pumps becomes no
longer economic is higher (ranging from 7 cents to 12 cents higher) for the
debt- than equity-financing irrigators. On the surface. this outcome might
seem surpr1s1ng. However. the lower annualized costs associated with equityfinanced new irrigation equipment apply to the diesel options as well as to
the electric options. Since the investment requirements for the diesel options exceed those for the electric options. shifting the assumption in
analysis from debt- to equity-financing implies some relative cost advantage
to the diesel versus electric options.
13 A technical exception is the Union REC farm with equity-financing. 1980
crop prices. and up-front electric charges. The middle segment of its
demand function. which covers a price range of 11 to 20 cents per kWh. has a
slightly lower elasticity than its "end" segment covering a price range of 1
to 11 cents per kWh.
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In the higher electricity price ranges, the direct price elasticity of
demand for electricity to pump irrigation water is higher for equityfinancing irrigators.
With "low" electricity prices, a generally opposite
outcome prevails.
1980 versus 1985 cOllllOdity prices. With the relatively higher 1980
crop prices, eight of the ten demand functions shift to the right as economic
theory (with all other conditions the same) would suggest. In four situations, the entire demand function shifts to the right. In four others, the
rightward shift is only in the lower kWh price range. In the other two
situations, the failure of the "other things the same" assumption of economic
theory to hold gives rise to "unexpected" findings. In one instance, the
electrically powered irrigation systems drop out at a lower kWh price with
the 1980 crop prices than they do with the lower 1985 commodity prices. In
the other instance, less electric energy is used in pumping irrigation water
in the lower kWh price range with 1980 than 1985 crop prices. The latter
outcome arises because of the substitution of the two center pivots of -corn
with 1985 prices by soybeans with 1980 prices. Soybeans require slightly
less irrigation water than corn and hence, also, less electric power for
pumping irrigation water. Finally, in nine of the ten paired comparisons,
the direct price elasticities of demand for electricity to pump irrigation
water in the upper price ranges of the kWh energy charges are considerably
higher with 1980 than 1985 commodity prices.
Paid verllUS waived aonthly d8118Dd charges. In this analysis, the impact on the derived demand for electric power to pump irrigation water of irriga tors choosing to follow load management controls during all five months
of the irrigation season is examined. With the Clay-Union REC farm, a clear
pattern is shown in the findings. For all four paired comparisons and at
"low" kWh prices, load management fol1owers use no more electric power than
their non-follower counterparts. The kWh price at which electrically energized irrigation systems become uneconomic is 3 to 4 cents higher for the
load management followers.
The outcome for the Union REC farm, however, is quite different. In
three of the four paired comparisons, electric power usage at "low" electric
prices is greater for load management followers than non-followers. Further,
in three of the four paired comparisons, electrically energized irrigation
systems become uneconomic at lower kWh prices for load management followers
than for non-followers.
The direct price elasticities of demand for electricity to pump irrigation water show a definite pattern of being greater at higher kWh prices for
load management followers than for non-followers. At "low" electricity
prices on the other hand, no clear patterns of difference are shown.
Zero versus 1985 levels of up-front electric rate charges. This
analysis involves further attention to changes in the form of electric rate
charges.
The structural change involves eliminating both types of up-front
(annual minimum and monthly demand) charges. As a consequence, the total
payment for electric power for irrigation is assumed to be assessed through
the single-step energy charge.
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In three of the four paired comparisons, the electric power demand
functions are vertically displaced upward roughly to the extent of the
per-kWh cost equivalent of the up-front charges [e.g., in Figure 3, Panels
"i" versus "a", by about 5.8 cents (7.6 cents - 1.8 cents)].- These outcomes imply only a limited impact on irrigation use from the structural
change in electric power rates. In the fourth situation (Union REC farm,
debt-financing, 1980 crop prices), however, the structural change in electric
power rates does impact the nature of the demand for power (e.g., with zero
up-front charges, electrically powered irrigation systems become non-economic
at even lower electric power rates than when the up-front charges are included in the electric rate structure assessed against farmers).
The impacts of eliminating both up-front electric rate charges on the
direct price elasticities of demand for electricity to pump irrigation water
are generally the same as indicated above with only the monthly demand charge
being eliminated. However, the extents of elasticity differential with both
up-front charges eliminated are generally less than those when only the
monthly demand charge is eliminated. For one of the four paired comparisons
involving the elimination of both up-front charges, an opposite outcome
prevails.
Based on the findings from these last two sections, two types of overall
conclusions can be drawn. Eliminating altogether one or both of the up-front
electric rate charges does not lead to one common type of impact on the nature of demand for electricity to pump irrigation water. In some instances,
the nature of demand is impacted little. In others, the nature of the
derived demand for electric power is impacted, but with no uniform pattern.
Second, eliminating altogether one or both of the up-front electric rate
charges generally leads irrigators to show a more elastic demand for
electricity to pump irrigation water at higher kWh prices.
Estiaated cross price deaand functions for irrigation water

At the lowest electric power rates, the amounts of irrigation water
pumped per irrigation season per irrigator range from about 175 acre-feet to
750 acre-feet (Figures 5 and 6). At electricity prices at which electrically
powered irrigation systems are no longer economic, irrigation water--ranging
from about 175 acre-feet to 700 acre-feet per irrigator--continues to be
pumped.
This outcome arises because, as electric power rates increase, diesel
powered irrigation systems tend to replace the electric powered systems. In
7 of the 20 situations examined, the substitution of diesel for electric
power is complete, i.e., the estimated cross demand functions for irrigation
water are perfectly inelastic~showing that whenever an electrically powered
system drops out it is replaced by a diesel powered system. As electric
power rates rise in the other 13 situations, the scale of irrigation drops
off some, with diesel systems replacing only part of the electric systems
that had been economic at lower electric power rates (and, in some instances,
with diesel sprinkler systems replacing gated pipe systems for which water is
lifted by electrically energized pumps).

34

20

20
.c
~

iQ.

.
c

""...ID
.,

12

8

cID

ID

0

4

0

a.

~

16

""i

12

cID

.c
~

l_
l

16

""i

12

cID

8

.

Q.

0

0

4

100 200 300 400 500 800
Acre-feet of irrigation water
b. Equity-financing, 1985 commodity prices,
with AM and MD charges
20

8
4

8

0
100 200 300 400 500
Acre-feet of Irrigation water
Debt-financing, 1985 commodity prices,
with AM and MD chargea

20

Q.

12

Q.

0

.

18

0

-- ...

j

4

0

100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Acre-feet of irrigation water
c. Debt-financing, 1980 crop prices ,
with AM and MD charges
24

100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Acre-feet of Irrigation water
d. Equity-financing, 1980 crop prices,
with AM and MD charges

20
16

~

16

""i

12

.

Q.

cID

.c
~

""ID...

.

8

0

4

12

Q.

8

cID

4

0

0

0

100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Acre-feet of irrigation water

100 200 300
Acre-feet of irrigation water
e. Debt-financing, 1985 commodity prices,
with AM charges, without MD charges
24

f. Equity- financing, 1985 commodity prices,
with AM charges, without MD charges

20
.c
~

""i

.
c

16

.c
~

12

Q.

""ID...

12

c"'ID

8

Q.

8

ID

0

4

0

0

100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Acre-feet of irrigation water
h. Equity-financing, 1980 crop prices,
with AM charges, without MD charges
24

g. Debt-financing, 1980 crop prices,
with AM charges, without MD charges
24

20

20
~

""i

Q.

.c
~

16

""i
.,

12

c"'ID

0

8

16

Q.

12

c:ID

8

0

--

4

4

0

0
100 200 300 400 500
Acre-feet of irrigation water
Debt-financing, 1985 commodity prices,
without AM and MD charges

Note:

4

0

100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Acre-feet of irrigation water

.c

16

100 200 300 400 500 600 700
Acre-feet of irrigation water
j. Debt-financing, 1980 crop prices,

without AM and MD charges

I n t he above pa lle l t it l es , (a) AM ~ a nnual minimum and MD • month ly demand and (b ) "debtfi nancin g" and " e qui t y- f inancin g" mean i rr igat o r s who fi nan ce new i rr igation equipment with
deb t- and equity- capi t al , r es pe c tive l y.

Fi gure 5. Es timated c r oss p r ice demand fu nc t ions f o r ir r igat i on wate r , Clay- Uni on REC r e presen t ative farm .

35

28

24
.l!

20

...~

18

i
c•
•

12

•

i

---,

8

(.)

4

0

(.)

20
18

8
4
0

100
300
500
700
Acre-ffft of irrigation water
b. Equly-ftwicilQ, 198e commodly pric..,
wllh AM and MO c:Nrgea

Debt-financing, 1985 commodity prlcea,
with AM and MO chargea

38

38
32

32

28

28
.l!

24

i

...~
&
c•

20

0.

•

16

c•

•

12

(.)

--1

12

100
300
500
Acre-ffft of irrigation water
L

---, ___1

28

24

·--L

24
20

-I

16
12

(.)

8

8

4

;i

0

" "300
'""
'
100
500" "
700
Acre-feet of irrigation water
c. Debt ... ld'IQ, 1980 crap pricea,
with AM and MO chargee

I

I

I

I

100

I

I

I

I

300

I

I

I

I

I

500

I

I

700

Acre-feet of irrigation water

d. Equly-fNnclnQ. 1980 crap pr1cea,
with AM and MO chargea

24
.l!

20

...

16

i0.

12

~

..

c

20
.l!

...~
i0.

c•
•

8
4

•

(.)

(.)

0

.. ___ t.

16

- - -,•

12

I

8
4

0
100

100
a. Oebt-INncnQ. 1985 commodly prices,
wilh AM ctwgee. wihout MO ctwgea

t.

300
500
1985 commodity prices,
with AM c:hargea, wllhoul MO ctwgea
E~

32
28
24

20

20

.l!

it

...

16

i

12

..
c

12

0.

8

•

(.)

4

300

500

700

I

4
0
100

100

-I
I

8

0

300

700

500

h. Equity-flnanci"lg, 1980 crop prices,
with AM charges, wfthou1 MO charges

g. Oebt-fhanciiQ. 1980 crap pricea,
wfth AM charges, without MD charges

36

36

32

32

28

28

.l!

it

...

20

20

i0.

18

..

12

.
c

12

(.)

-r

24

24

16

--L

8

8

4

4

0

r- 100

0

300

500

r
700

Acre-feet of irrigation water

100
300
500
Acre-feet of irrigation water

Debt-financi"lg, 1980 crop prices,
without AM and MD charges

Oebt-financi"lg, 1985 commodity prices ,
without AM and MO charges
~ote:

-i_

16

In the above panel titles, ( a) Ai."!:• annual minimum and MD• monthly demand and ( b) "debtfi nanci ng" mean i rr igato rs who finan ce new i rrigati o n equipment wit h de bt- and equi t y- c apit al.

respe c t ively .
figure 6.
fa rm.
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Three of the 10 cross demand functions for irrigation water for the
Union REC farm have "atypical" backward bending (upward sloping) segments.
This outcome arises from increased kWh prices at the low end of the kWh price
spectrum that result in wa e~intensive gated pipe systems replacing center
pivot systems. with a result that the amounts of irrigation water pumped increase.
Then. at higher kWh prices. center pivot diesel systems replace the
gated pipe systems and hence the amounts of irrigation water pumped decrease.
The responsiveness of irrigation water pumping to rising electric power
rates is generally much greater for the Union REC representative farm than
for the Clay-Union REC farm. This outcome arises because of the added gated
pipe surface irrigation option on the Union REC farm.
For six of eight paired comparisons. the cross demand functions for i~
rigation water are shifted farther to the right for equity- than debtfinancing irrigators. In five of the eight situations. the demand functions
for equity-financing irrigators have more steps than do those for debtfinancing irrigators.
Further. for nine of the ten comparable situations.
the cross demand functions for irrigation water are shifted farther to the
right for irrigators with 1980 crop prices than with the lower 1985 commodity
prices.
RATE STRUCTURE ANALYSIS

In the prior demand analysis. greater attention is given to changes in
the level of charge than to the form of charge for electricity. In this section. relatively more explicit attention is given to the form of electric
rate charge. The impacts on irrigators and the RECs of different levels of
up-front (annual minimum and monthly demand) and energy (kWh) charges. differently configured energy (kWh) block rates. and load management controls
are each examined in turn.

Different
charges

levels

of

•fixed•

up-front and variable

energy electric rate

Rural electric cooperatives are faced with high fixed costs that derive
directly from their substantial investments in electric power transmission
and physical plant facilities and indirectly via the cost structure for the
wholesale power which they purchase that embodies the high fixed cost of
coal-based electric generation facilities.
The appendix to this report
shows. for example. that 38% of the Clay-Union REC's operating costs for i~
rigation are plant-related "facilities" charges. 46% are demand charges. and
only 15% are variable energy (kWh) charges. In this study's Clay-Union and
Union REC representative farm · baseline solutions. the "fixed" up-front
electric charges account for between 75% and 80% of the irrigators'
total
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electric power payments for irrigation (Table 5). 14

In years of unusually great precipitation and/or widespread participation of irrigators in acr~ age set-aside government commodity programs, irrigation pumping may drop off greatly . To guard against electric power
revenue shortfalls in such circumstances, most RECs adopt electric pricing
policies that result in the passing on of their "fixed" costs to their customers in the form of "fixed" up-front electric rate charges.
Some irrigators object to having to make large "fixed" up-front payments
for their electrically powered irrigation systems. They would prefer that a
larger proportion of their irrigation electric power payments be in the form
of energy (kWh) charges. They place particular value on being able to exercise direct control over the amount of their irrigation electric power bills-through determining when and for how long during the irrigation season
charges should be assessed against their irrigation systems. Further, some
irrigators believe that many of the REC fixed cost facilities are already
paid off and, therefore, that 5hey should not have to continue to bear large
up-front electricity payments. 1
The cost of service investment analysis outlined in the appendix shows
(1) the relatively large proportions of REC operating costs that are "fixed"
and (2) the extended numbers of years over which capital assets are
depreciated.
Once those depreciation periods are exhausted, the capital assets usually have to be replaced, which sets in motion new series of even
higher dollar rates of depreciation (because of inflation) for the RECs.
Although large proportions of REC operating costs are "fixed", the
"fixed" costs do not generally diminish over time, and irrigators served by
the Clay-Union and Union RECs are reported to be generally accepting of the
current structure of charges for irrigation pumping power, the impacts of
pricing electricity through varying proportions of "fixed" up-front and variable energy (kWh) charges are examined.
The rationale for undertaking this
analysis is partly scientific curiosity and partly to generate information
that could be used in responding to the concerns of irrigators who would
strongly prefer to pay for electric power via rate structures with a higher
proportion of variable to fixed charges.

14Th e annua1 minimum
. .
.
.
.
. "f"ixe d" in
. t h at an
c h arge f or an irrigation
system is
irrigator must pay it regardless of whether or not he operates the system.
After the expiration of the initial contract period between an irrigator and
an REC, however, irrigation systems can be "pulled out" without the
irrigator having a continuing obligation to meet the annual minimum payment
on the system.
The monthly demand charge is "fixed" in a different regard. This charge can
be avoided totally if an irrigation system is not activated during a monthly
billing period. But an irrigator must pay it in full if the irrigation
system is used for even "one moment" during the monthly billing period.

15 The periods specified in contracts between irrigators and RECs are
generally much shorter than the average length of time over which an REC's
various capital assets are depreciated.
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Table 5.

"Fixed" up-front versus variable energy charges. Clay-Union and Union REC representative farm baseline
solutions. irrigators with debt- versus equity-financed new irrigation equipment. 1985 and 1980 crop
prices.
ClaI-Union REC
Debt-financins
EguitI-financins
Dollars Percent
Dollars Percent

Union REC
Debt-financins
EguitI-financins
Dollars Percent
Dollars Percent

Solutions with 1985
commodity prices
Annual minimum charges
Monthly demand charges
Sub-total of up-front charges
Energy charges
Total electric power charges

2.355
2.381
(4. 736)
1.507
6.243

37.7
38.2
(75.9)
24.1
100.0

3.175
3.531
(6.706)
2.016
8.722

36.4
40.5
(76.9)
23 .1
100.0

2. 749
2.734
(5.483)
1.391
6.874

40.0
39.8
(79.8)
20.2
100.0

2.263
2.250
(4.513)
1.307
5.820

38.9
38. 7
(77.6)
.. 22.4
100.0

Solutions with 1980
crop prices
CJ
Annual minimum charges
'° Monthly demand charges
Sub-total of up-front charges
Energy charges
Total electric power charges

4.259
5.269
(9.528)
2.704
12.232

34.8
43 .1
(77.9)
22.1
100.0

3.810
5.457
(9. 267)
2.396
11.663

32.7
46.8
(79.5)
20.5
100.0

2.263
2.250
(4.513)
1.314
5.827

38.8
38.6
(77 .4)
22.6
100.0

2.263
2.250
(4.513)
1.307
5.820

38.9
38. 7
(77.6)
22.4
100.0

In exploring this issue. the impacts of both increasing and decreasing
one-at-a-time each of the annual minimum. monthly demand. and energy charges
are determined. All other prices (including only 1985 commodity prices) and
the technological coefficients are held the same in analysis. The "increased" electric rates are set at double their respective 1985 baseline
levels.
The "decreased" electric rates are set at 25% of their baseline
levels (i.e •• at 75% less than their respective 1985 baseline levels).
Optimal solutions for each of the representative farms are determined with
each of these alternate electric rate structures.
The results of this analysis for the Clay-Union and Union REC representative farms are presented in Figures 7 and 8.
The histogram-bars that
reflect results from the baseline solutions with 1985 electric power rates
are described as showing 100%-level outcomes.
The three histogram-bars to
the left of the center baseline bars reflect outcomes for the respective oneat-a-time doubling in price for the three electric rate components. and the
bars to the right of center reflect outcomes for the 75% reduced electric
rate charges.
Acre-inches of irrigation water puaped. The one-at-a-time increased
and decreased up-front and energy charges have essentially no impact on irrigation pumping in three of the four representative farm situations examined.
The exceptional situation involves the Union REC debt-financing
situation.
In this case. a doubling of either the annual minimum or monthly
demand charge leads to a 53% reduction in irrigation pumping. whereas a
decrease to 25% of the baseline rates for either of these two types of charges leads to a 53% increase in irrigation pumping. These results arise from
the elimination of a gated pipe system with the increased up-front charges
and the addition of an extra gated pipe system with the decreased up-front
charges.
Electricity for puaping irrigation water.
Patterns of change in irrigation pumping power are only loosely related to changes in irrigation
pumping.
This outcome arises because (1) the irrigation technology options
considered in the model involve various intensities of energy and water use
and (2) the optimal solutions reflect a sensitivity to these and other differences in the various options considered.
For the Clay-Union REC farm. the irrigation power pumping requirement is
the same for the solutions involving one-at-a-time reduced electric rate
charges as for the 1985 baseline solutions. The solutions involving one-ata-time increased electric rate charges. however. involve 20% (equityfinancing of new irrigation equipment) to 46% (debt-financing) less irrigation pumping power being used.
For Union REC farm irrigators with equity-financed new irrigation equipment. · increased or reduced up-front and energy charges have essentially no
impact . on the irrigation power pumping requirement. Union REC farm irrigators with debt-financed irrigation equipment. however. respond differently to one-at-a-time changes in up-front charges.
Power usage drops by 56%
when either the annual minimum or monthly demand charge is increased (two
high pressure center pivots are converted to low pressure and one gated pipe
system drops out). and increases by 18% when either of the up-front charges
is decreased (an extra gated pipe system is added).
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Figure 8. Impacts of one-at-a-time increased and decreased "fixed" up-front (AM =
annual minimum and MD • monthly demand) and variable (EC = energy charge) ele c tr ic
rate charges, Union REC representative farm, irrigators with debt- versus equit yfinanced new irrigation equipment, 1985 commodity prices.
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REC irrigation power revenue.
A one-at-a-time doubling in the
individual electric rate charges leads to just as many instances of a
decrease. as of an increase. in REC irrigation power revenue. Each instance
of a one-at-a-time reduc~ ion in the individual electric rate charges.
however. involves a reduction in REC irrigation power revenue. The impacts
of comparable one-at-a-time changes in electric rate charges in each situation are much more similar between the annual minimum and monthly demand
rates than between either up-front charge and the energy charge.

Reducing energy charges to 25% of the baseline rate results in a 15% to
18% reduction in REC irrigation power revenue. Reducing either annual minimum or monthly demand charges to 25% of their respective baseline rates
results in a 20% to 30% reduction in REC irrigation power.
The pattern of impacts on
Return to irrigator labor and aanageaent.
irrigator profits from one-at-a-time increased and decreased electric power
rates is rather clear.
In 11 of the 12 situations involving increased
electric power rates. profits are impacted negatively. In all 12 situations
involving decreased electric power rates. profits are impacted positively.
The negative profit impacts range from roughly $375 to $2.650. whereas the
positive profit impacts range from roughly $1.800 to $3.550.
The final focus of analysis in this section is on a very practical consideration to REC management. What if an REC were to decrease its annual
minimum or monthly demand charges and then unusually heavy precipitation were
to be experienced? To what extent would REC revenues become vulnerable from
such a policy decision on rates and such a natural circumstance?
To investigate this question. differences in REC revenues (and irrigator
profits) in circumstances with normal versus unusually heavy precipitation-under assumed one-at-a-time 75% reductions in annual minimum and monthly
demand charges--are examined.
The normal precipitation circumstances are
those just described in this section. The budgeting of the impacts of unusually heavy precipitation is based on the assumptions and procedures used
for examining this phenomenon in the above section entitled "unusually heavy
or light versus normal precipitation."
The findings from this analysis for the two REC representative farms are
presented in Table 6. Separate attention is given to irrigators with debtversus equity-financed new irrigation equipment. The main finding from this
analysis is the following. If RECs were to reduce by 75% one or the other of
their up-front electric rate charges and then their irrigator clients were to
experience unusually heavy precipitation. the REC revenues from electric
power would be reduced by $330 to $485 per irrigator. These reductions
amount to 7% to 10% of the respective REC revenues with normal precipitation.
In response to the unusually heavy precipitation. irrigators with debtfinanced new irrigation equipment would realize added profits ranging from
nearly $10.000 to over $26.000. The corresponding impacts on profits for irrigators with equity-financed new irrigation equipment are less. but nevertheless substantial (roughly $3.500 to $7.000 per irrigator).
Because RECs are not permitted by federal law to carry forward positive
margins from one year to another. even a 7% to 10% unexpected reduction in
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Table 6.

Selected impacts of unusually heavy precipitation when annual minimum and
monthly demand charges are reduced one-at-a-time to 25% of their respective
levels in 1985. irrigators with debt-financed versus equity-financed new
irrigation equipment. Clay-Union and Union REC representative farms.
Clay-Union REC
representative farm
Annual
Monthly
minimum
demand
charge
charge

~
~

Irrigators with debt-financed new
irrigation equipment
Impacts on REC revenues
Dollar decrease per irrigator
Dollar decrease as a percent of
the revenue with normal
precipitation
Impacts on irrigator profits
Dollar increase per irrigator
Dollar profits per irrigator
with normal precipitation
Irrigators with eguiti-financed new
irrigation eguipment
Impacts on REC revenues
Dollar decrease per irrigator
Dollar decrease as a percent of
the revenue with normal
precipitation
Impacts on irrigator profits
Dollar increase per irrigator
Dollar profits per irrigator
with normal precipitation

Union REC
representative farm
Annual
Monthly
minimum
demand
charge
charge

330

330

485

485

7.4

7.4

8.9

8.9

26.515

26.515

9.895

9.895

7 .170

7 .185

-a.sos

-8.820

441

441

400

400

7.0

7.3

9.7

9.6

6.895

6.895

3.570

3.570

12.065

12.335

230

220

REC revenue in a particular year would somehow have to be covered in that
same year. The prior analysis shows that if the REC revenue shortfall occurred as a result of unusually heavy precipitation. irrigators with dryland
would derive substantial e~onomic benefits from the added precipitation. In
principle. an after-season rate adjustment mechanism could be created to
transfer enough of that precipitation benefit to the REC to meet its fixed
cost obligations--in exchange for a concession by the REC to irrigators for
part of the burden of the electric payment for irrigation to be shifted from
"fixed" up-front to variable energy (kWh) charges. From three standpoints.
however. such a pricing policy would probably be ill-advised.
1. The more complex a rate pricing policy. the greater the difficulties
in administering the policy. Administrative encumberances could be expected
to arise in (a) ensuring that all irrigators would know about and clearly understand the after-season rate adjustment provision. (b) arriving at a common
agreement between individual irrigators and the REC on whether (and. if so.
how much) precipitation during the irrigation season is unusually great. and
(c) collecting the additional electric payments after the irrigation pumping
season ends.
In addition. special pricing features for one electric rate
class (electric power consuming sector) not shared by other rate classes can
be expected to lead to possible customer discontent and misunderstanding.
2. Such a rate adjustment policy would do nothing to compensate for REC
revenue shortfalls that could arise from non-precipitation based reductions
in irrigation pumping. e.g •• from acreage set-aside government commodity
programs.
3. Perhaps most significant and as indicated above. two features of the
current electric rate structure already provide for the sharing of risks between irrigators and RECs during seasons of unusual irrigation pumping. The
spreading of the "fixed" up-front costs over fewer kWhs results in higher
average costs per kWh in years of unusually little pumping. The two-stepped
declining energy (kWh) block rate also results in higher average variable kWh
costs with limited· irrigation pumping.
Conversely. when irrigation pumping
during an irrigation season is unusually great. both features contribute to a
below-normal overall average cost per kWh for the electric power used by an
irrigator.
Differently configured energy (kWh) charge block rates

The 1985 Clay-Union and Union REC electric rate structures for irrigation provide for a two-step variable energy (kWh) charge--in addition to
"fixed" up-front annual minimum and monthly demand-charges. In the analysis
of differently configured energy (kWh) block rates. attention is given to a
single-step energy charge and to three-step declining and three-step increasing energy block rates. The "fixed" up-front electric charges are specified
in some models at 1985 levels and in others at zero levels. The primary purpose of this analysis is to determine if differently configured energy block
rates. in combination with different policies regarding the assessment of
"fixed" up-front electric rate charges. would provide incentive for either
greater or lesser electric power and water usage in irrigation.
The heights of the steps (i.e •• the levels of the prices for the various
steps) and the lengths of the steps (i.e •• the numbers of kWhs covered by
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each bounded step) in the alternative block rate structures were determined
as follows. The alternative energy block rate prices were specified relative
to the average costs per kWh in the respective baseline solutions (call them
AC).
These AC values becfme (1) the single-step block rate prices and
(2) the middle-step prices in the three-step block rate models (Table 7).
The first and the third-step prices were arbitrarily set at 90% .more and 90%
less than the respective AC values. In the increasing three-step block
rate models, the first and third-step declining block rate charges are
interchanged.
The first-step energy (kWh) charge in the 1985 electric rate structure
applies to the first 100 kWh per average kW per season. Since the average kW
per season differ for high pressure center pivot, low pressure center pivot;
and gated pipe water distribution, the amounts of power covered by the first
bounded step for these irrigation technologies are 6,300 kWh, 3,360 kWh, and
1,680 kWh, respectively.
The lengths of the blocks in the three-step block rate analysis for the
debt- and equity-financing Clay-Union and Union REC representative farms were
determined in relation to the average kWh power usages per irrigation system
in the respective baseline solutions (call them BL). By arbitrarily dividing each BL by three, the kWh designated for coverage with each of the
first- and second-steps in the· three-step block rate models were determined
to be as follows:
-Clay-Union REC debt-financing irrigator:

13,675 kWh;

-Clay-Union REC equity-financing irrigator:
-Union REC debt-financing irrigator:
-Union REC equity-financing irrigator:

7,290 kWh;

8,060 kWh; and
4,675 kWh.

The results of the alternative energy block rate analysis are presented
in Figures 9 and 10. The first histogram-bar in each panel represents the
baseline solution result. The other histogram-bars represent the results for
the alternative block rate models as follows:
- Second and third bars:

single-step models;

- Fourth and fifth bars:

three-step declining block rate models; and

- Sixth and seventh bars:

three-step increasing block rate models.

The "fixed" up-front electric charges were set at the 1985 levels in the
models underlying the first, second, fourth, and sixth bars and were
eliminated in the models underlying the third, fifth, and seventh bars.
As long as the 1985 "fixed" up-front components are retained in the
electric rate structures, no modified energy block rate structure has any
significant (more than 1%) impact on irrigation electric power or water usage
for either REC representative farm. This is shown by the values for the even
numbered bars in the top two panel-tiers of Figures 9 and 10 differing from
those for the baseline-bars by no more than 1%·.
46

Table 7.

Differently configured variable energy (kWH) block rate charges assumed in analysis.
Clay-Union and Union REC representative farms.

Block rate model
Baseline two-step
Debt-financing
Equity-financing
Single-step
1985 up-front charges
Debt-financing
Equity-financing
Zero up-front charges
Debt-financing
Equity-financing
Three-step declining block
1985 up-front charges
Debt-financing
Equity-financing
Zero up-front charges
Debt-financing
Equity-financing
Three-step increasing block
1985 up-front charges
Debt-financing
Equity-financing
Zero up-front charges
Debt-financing
Equity-financing

Level of charge (cents per kWh)
Clay-Union REC representative farm Union REC representative farm
First- Second- ThirdFirst- Second- Thirdstep
step
step
step
step
step
3.26
3.26

1.58
1.58

n/a
n/a

3.26
3.26

1.58
1.58

n/a
n/a

1.84
1.84

n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a

1.92
1.86

n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a

7.61
7.98

n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a

9.47
8.30

n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a

3.50
3.50

1.84
1.84

0.18
0.18

3.65
3.53

1.92
1.86

0.19
0.19

14.46
15.16

7.61
7.98

0.76
0.80

17.99
15.77

9.47
8.30

0.95
0.83

0.18
0.18

1.84
1.84

3.50
3.50

0.19
0.19

1.92
1.86

3.65
3.53

0.76
0.80

7.61
7.98

14.46
15.16

0.95
0.83

9.47
8.30

17.99
15.77

aThe baseline block rate charges reflect the basic 4.2 and 2.6 cent per kWh two-step energy
charges. adjusted down by the 1.1 cent per kWh Basin credit and adjusted up by an assumed 5%
interest time money cost.
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Figure 9. Impacts of differently configured energy (kWh) block rate charges, ClayUnion REC representative farm, irrigators with debt- versus equity-financed new
i rrigation equipment.
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When

the "fixed" up-front electric charge components are set at zero.
some differences arise in irrigation electric power and water usage
with the modified variable block rate structures versus the respective
baseline rate structures--especially for the Union REC representative farm.
The directions of impact for the leveraged Union REC debt-financing irrigator
are the opposite of those for the Union REC-equity-financing irrigator.
howev~r.

For the Union REC debt-financing irrigator. the impacts on electric
energy use of the single-step and the three-step declining block rates and
the three-step increasing block rate are all essentially the same. namely.
18% to 20% less power usage. In the first two situations. irrigation water
pumping is cut by 53%. With the increasing block rate structure. however.
irrigation pumping increases by 53%. The reduced power and water usage with
the single-step and three-step declining block rates arises from the dropping
out of a gated pipe system that is in the baseline solution. With the threestep increasing block rate. two rather than one gated pipe system and two low
rather than high pressure center pivots are under corn production.
For the Union REC equity-financing irrigator. on the other hand. the
single-step and three-step declining block rates provide incentive for 37% to
40% more power usage. The added power usage (but reduced irrigation pumping)
with the single-step block rate arises from the irrigation of (1) six rather
than (2) two low pressure center pivots of corn and three gated pipe systems
as in the baseline solution.
The added power usage with the three-step
declining block rate is associated with two high pressure rather than two low
pressure center privots of corn.
The Clay-Union REC representative farm is almost totally unresponsive in
irrigation energy and water use to the modified energy (kWh) block rate
structures.
The only exceptions are (1) a 46% reduction in power use with a
three-step increasing block rate and zero "fixed" up-front charges for the
debt-financing irrigator and (2) a 34% increase in power use with a threestep declining block rate and zero "fixed" up-front charges for the equity. financing irrigator.
In instances of more than a 1% change in electric power usage. REC irrigation power revenues (irrigator payments for power to energize their irrigation pumps) vary directly with the changes in electric power usage. In
instances of reduced power usage. the percentage reduction in REC irrigation
power revenue is equal to or greater than the percent reduction in power use.
In instances of increased power usage. on the other hand. the percentage increase in irrigation power increase is equal to or less than the percent increase in power use.
For the Clay-Union REC representative farm. the returns to irrigator
labor· and management. with one exception. are impacted by no more than 3%
with the different block rate structures. The one exception is a 25% increase in irrigator profit associated with the three-step increasing block
rate and zero "fixed" up-front electric rate charges.
For the Union REC
debt-financing irrigator. the pattern of outcomes is similar to that for the
Clay-Union REC representative farm (negative. rather than positive. returns
are involved with the Union REC farm. however). For the Union REC equityfinancing irrigator. the impacts on the return to· labor and management are
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positive for each of the modified electric rate structures except one
(single-step block rate with no "fixed" up-front electric rate charges).
The two principal fin9ings from the analysis of differently configured
energy (kWh) block rates are the following.
1. The impacts of modified energy block rates on irrigation electric
power and water usage are relatively limited.
As long as the 1985 "fixed"
up-front electric rate components are retained in the rate structures, for
example, the impacts of the single-step, three-step declining, and three-step
increasing block rates (rather than the 1985 two-step declining block rate)
on energy and water usage are 1% or less.
2. When the "fixed" up-front electric rate charges are set at zero,
more sizeable impacts of modified energy block rates on irrigation energy and
water use are experienced. The impacts do not conform to a single pattern,
however, as might be hypothesized on the basis of simple micro production
theory (all other things the same). For example, common patterns of increased energy and/or water usage are not associated with more strongly
graduated declining block rates (than in the 1985 baseline electric rate
structure).
Neither are common patterns of decreased energy and/or water
usage associated with the three-step increasing energy (kWh) block rate
charges.
Load 11811ageaent controls

As indicated above, the Clay-Union and Union RECe in 1985 offered a load
management option to their irrigator clients.
Monthly demand charges were
waived during any month of the irrigation season when irrigators wou1d agree
for the p~er to their irrigation systems to be turned off daily between 5
and 9 pm.
If irrigators did not elect the load management option, they
were entitled to receive a 1.1 cent per kWh Basic credit for all electric
power used.
All-season following of load aanageaent controls. In our initial microeconomic analysis of load management, we assume that an irrigator would opt
either to follow load management throughout the entire irrigation season or
not at all during the irrigation season. Thus, in this part of the analysis,
no attention is given to the possibility of an irrigator opting into and out

16 In the following analyses, no account is given to the time and
inconvenience associated with irrigators having to reactivate their
irrigation systems following the daily 5 to 9 pm shut-downs of their
systems. This simplified analytic procedure was adopted, not because of a
view that such time and inconvenience is of no consequence, but because of
wide variations among irrigators in (1) the amounts of time required to
reactivate their systems and (2) the value that they place on such added
time and inconvenience.
Incidentally, in 1986, provisions for the load management option were
changed so that the 5 to 9 pm power interruptions were made only on those
days during the irrigation season when the RECs were experiencing a peaking
in their power demand.
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of load management controls
experiencing moisture stress.

depending

on

whether

an irrigated

crop is

In this analysis. a ~o-part budgeting procedure is followed. In the
first part, the electric power related benefits and costs of load management
are determined.
In the second part, attention is given to possible yield
losses from following load management.
The electric power related benefits from following load management are
represented by the potentially waived monthly demand charges (Table 8). The
magnitudes of these benefits for the various crops and irrigation technologies are calculated taking into account the monthly demand charges for
the different irrigation technologies (Table 20, Report 1) and the monthly
durations of the irrigation season for the different crops (Table 10, Report
1).
The costs of following load management are represented by the aggregate
amount of the foregone Basin credit to which load management non-followers
are entitled. These costs reflect the cross-product of:
- The irrigation application rates (inches) for the respective crops and
REC service areas (Table 10, Report 1);
- The acres per irrigation system,
for gated pipe systems:

namely, 130 for center pivot and 160

- The kilowatt hour requirement per acre-inch of irrigation water pumped, namely, 28.69. 15.35 1 and 5.59 for high pressure center pivot. low pressure center pivot. and gated pipe water distribution. respectively (p 19.
Report l); and
- The per-unit Basin credit of $0.011 per kWh.
By subtracting the electric power related costs from the electric power
related benefits. the net electric power benefits from following load management throughout the duration of the irrigation season are determined. These
net benefits per irrigation system range from $181 for gated pipe irrigated
corn in Union County to $2,200 for high pressure center pivot irrigated alfalfa in - Clay County.
Since the net electric power related benefits are
positive for all combinations of crops and types of irrigation. irrigators in
the Clay-Union and Union REC service areas could have derived in 1985 a clear
economic electric power related net benefit from following the load management option.
If by following the load management option. however. the yield of an irrigated crop would be adversely affected. further analysis would be required.
Yield reductions can be expected if (1) irrigated crops are experiencing
moisture-related stress and (2) the supply of irrigation water is interrupted
because of load management controls.
The second budgeting component, therefore, involves determining the
break-even yield losses that irrigators can afford to sustain from following
load management throughout the duration of the irrigation season (Table 9).
To do this. the net electric power related benefits per irrigation system are
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Table 8.

The electric power related benefits and costs of
following load ~anagement throughout the
duration of the irrigation season by crop and
type of irrigation, Clay-Union and Union REC
representative farms. 1985.a

Type of irrigation
Center pivot
High
Low
pressure
pressure

Gated
pipe

(dollars per irrigation system)

•

Clay-Union REC
Corn
Benefit
Cost
Net benefit
Soybeans
Benefit
Cost
Net benefit
Alfalfa
Benefit
Cost
Net benefit
Union REC
Corn
Benefit
Cost
Net benefit
Soybeans
Benefit
Cost
Net benefit

1, 190
451

-m

642
241
401

1. 785
443
1,342

963
237
726

2,975
775
2.200

1,605
_ill
1,190

1,206
328
878

642
176
466

l.il..

1,206
316
890

642
169
473

322
137
185

r
l

not
applicable

322
181

aThe electric power related benefit from following load
management is represented by the value of the monthly
demand charges that are waived as a result of an
irrigator electing to follow the load management option.
The electric power related cost from following load
management is represented by the amount of the foregone
Basin credit to which load management non-followers are
entitled.
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Table 9.

Break-even per-acre yield losses that
farmers can afford to sustain from following
load management throughout the duration of
the irriga tion season. by crop and type of
irrigation. Clay-Union and Union REC
representative farms. 1985.

TyEe of irrigation
Gated
Center Eivot
pipe
High
Low
pressure
pressure
Clai-Union REC
Corn (bu)
Soybeans (bu)
Alfalfa (ton)

2.4
2.0
0.38

1.3
1.1
0.20

n/a
n/a
n/a

Union REC
Corn (bu)
Soybeans (bu)

2.9
1.3

1.5
0.7

0.5
0. 2
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divided by (a) the acres per irrigation system and (b) the 1985 per-unit crop
prices (Table 1. Report 1).
For high pressure center pivot irrigators. the break-even per-acre yield
losses are no greater than 3 bu for corn. 2 bu for soybeans. and 0.38 ton for
alfalfa. These break-even losses are about 2.0%. 4.3%. and 6.9%. respectively. of the average expected yields with normal precipitation for corn.
soybeans. and alfalfa (Tables 2 and 4 0 Report 1). Thus. high pressure. center pivot irrigators who anticipate a yield reduction from daily interruptions in irrigation throughout the irrigation season from 5 to 9 pm equal to
or greater than these amounts are ill-advised economically to follow the load
management option.
With lesser or no anticipated yield losses. irrigators
can expect to benefit from following the load management option.
For low pressure center pivot and gated pipe irrigators. the maximum
tolerable yield losses from all-season load management are considerably less
than those for high pressure center pivot irrigators. The reduced margin for
loss arises primarily because of the lesser electric power requirement per
acre-inch of irrigation water pumped for these types of systems.
Selective aonth-by-aonth following of load aanageaent controls. In the
preceding analysis. following load management was treated as a seasonal "all
or none" proposition. The Clay-Union and Union REC load management option.
however. provides for the possibility of load management followers to stop
following the load management option at any time during any month that an irrigator desires to.
In this section. the possibility of an irrigator following load management selectively month-by-month is contrasted with the possibility of an irrigator not opting to follow load management. The contrast is illustrated
with high and low pressure center pivot (HP-CP and LP-CP) irrigated soybeans
in the Clay-Union REC service area.
The benefits and costs of following load management are analyzed monthby-month. taking into account pertinent technical and economic data (Table
10).
The monthly demand charges associated with HP-CP and LP-CP irrigated
production in the Clay-Union REC service area are $595 and $321. respectively
(Col 2).
The monthly gross irrigation water applications for Clay-Union
soybeans are as shown in Col 3. The amounts of the associated monthly foregone Basin credits are shown in Col 4. The net monthly benefits from following load management (Col 5) are converted to break-even yield losses as shown
in Col's 6 and 7.
The monthly break-even yield losses vary inversely with the amounts of
monthly irrigation applications. Further. the monthly break-even yield losses are about 85% more with HP than· LP water distribution. The maximum monthly break-even yield loss for soybeans (HP water distribution in September).
however.
is
only
53 lb per acre (1.8% of the yield with normal
precipitation).
Being able to manage irrigation water so as to avoid a minimum level of
moisture-stress leading to anything less than a 1.8% yield loss during a particular month is an unrealistic management objective for any irrigator. The
conclusion of this analysis. therefore. is clear. An irrigator following
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Table 10.

Technical and economic data for assessing the advisability of an irrigator selectively following
load management month-by-month. center pivot irrigated soybeans. Clay-Union REC study area. 1985.

Water
distribution
pressure and
month during
the irrigation
season
(1)

V1

°'

Monthly electric power related
benefits and costs per center
pivot from following
load management
Benefit:
waived
monthly
demand
charges($) a
(2)

Cost: foregone Basin credit
Gross irrigation Amount of
application
foregone Basin
(inches)
<:J:'edit_(_~1~

Break-even monthly
soybean yield losses
that an irrigator could
afford to sustain from
Net
!ollowing load management
monthly
d Pounds ger Percent of ¥ormal
benefg_($) ____li~!"e
yield

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

High pressure (HP)
July
August
September
Season total

595
595
595
1. 785

5.5
5.1
0.2
10.8

226
209
8
443

369
386
587
1.342

33
35
53
121

1.1
1.2
1.8
4.2

Low pressure (LP)
July
August
September
Season total

321
321
321
963

5.5
5.1
0.2
10.8

121
112
4
237

200
209
317
726

18
19
28
65

0.6
0.7
1.0
2.3

a

bFrom Table 20. Report 1.
From Table 10. Report 1.
cThe monthly foregone Basin credits are represented by the cross-product of (1) the respective monthly gross
irrigation applications; (2) 130 acres per center pivot; (3) 28.69 and 15.35 kWh per acre-inch of irrigation
dwater pumped for HP and LP water distribution. respectively; and (4) .the Basin credit of $0.011 per kWh.
The net monthly benefits represent the difference between the Col 2 and Col 4 values for the respective
months.
eThe monthly pounds per acre yield losses represent the respective net monthly electric power related benefits
per center pivot divided by (1) 130 acres per center pivot and (2) the 1985 price of soybeans of $0.0857 per
fpound ($5.14 per bu).
The irrigated soybean yield in the Clay-Union REC study area is 48 bu per acre.

J

load management who anticipates that a continued 5 to 9 pm interruption in
irrigation during any particular month would begin to place his irrigated
crop under any yield-reducing moisture-stress should straightaway "break the
seal". and opt out
! oad management control for the remainder of that
monthly billing period.

y;

Does the fact that the load management option is so sensitive to possible · yield losses imply that irrigators should stay away from load manageDepending on the provisions of a particular load
ment control programs?
management control program; the answer could be yes or no. The stipulations
of the Clay-Union and Union REC load management control option. however.
provide clear- economic incentive for irrigators to opt for load control in
all months except those in which power interruptions would result in yieldreducing moisture-stress. This can be seen from the following.
An irrigator who rejects load management controls thereby "earns the
right" to pump irrigation water 24 hours a day. every day of the month. As a
consequence. he/she "automatically" has to pay the monthly demand charge for
every month in the irrigation season.
An irrigator who opts for load management controls can pump irrigation
water for 20 out of every 24 hours a day every day of the month. with no consequential liability for paying monthly demand charges. As long as pumping
20 hours per day is adequate to meet the moisture-needs of an irrigated crop.
the irrigator is clearly better off than his "load management rejection"
counterpart because he has had a well watered irrigated crop without having
had to pay any monthly demand charges.

If yield-reducing moisture-stress should arise with the limited 20 hour
per day pumping in a particular month. however. the irrigator can immediately
opt out of the load management control program and pump 24 hours a day. He
thereby becomes no worse off. regarding the payment of the monthly demand
charge. than his "load management rejection" counterpart in that month. In
all months during the irrigation season when 20 hours per day of pumping is
adequate. on the other hand. the load management follower gains economically
as he avails himself of the waived monthly demand charges.
Thus. the central features that make the Clay-Union and Union REC load
management option attractive to irrigators are (1) the potential for irrigators to avoid paying monthly demand charges in any month during which 20
hour per day irrigation is adequate to meet the mositure needs of their crops
and (2) the possibility for a load management followers to opt out of the
load management control program (with no greater penalty than to pay the
monthly demand charge) whenever they determine that 20 hour per day irrigation would result in yield-reducing moisture-stress. This double-barreled
feature of the program contributes to the mutual economic welfare of both the
electric power supplier and the electric power user.
17 Although the illustration is developed for irrigated soybeans in the
Clay-Union REC service area. the conclusion for Clay-Union soybeans applies
also to each of the irrigated crops in both the Clay-Union REC service
areas. The next most likely "candidate" for a large break-even percentage
yield loss is alfalfa in May in which the irrigation water application rate
is 2.1 inches. The break-even yield loss for it. however. is only 1.6%.

57

LIMITATIONS OF THE S'IUDY
The analytic model employed in this study. as with any other study.
fails to accommodate all pertinent features of the real-world environment
being studied.
Those features believed to be the most limiting in this
regard are the following.
The actual farmer decision-making process is only crudely incorporated
into the MILP model. The only farmer managerial objective explicitly considered in the model is the maximization of revenues over and above the variable costs of farm production. No attention is given to other potentially
quantifiable objectives (regarding. for example. cash-flow management and
risk management) and less quantifiable objectives (e.g •• preferences regarding family involvement with the farm. farmer involvement in the home. leisure
time).
Neither is attention given to the investment credit (prevailing in
1985) and · tax deduction dimensions of irrigation investments nor the possible
participation of irrigators in government grain commodity programs.
The model covers only a single production period; yet. many decisions
are made by farmers within the context of several production periods. Crops
are considered individually; yet. some farmers plan cropping patterns with
rotational considerations in mind. Specific assumptions (e.g •• center pivots
that cover only 130 acres and gated pipe systems that cover only 160 acres of
land each. land and labor resource availabilities. insurance rates. commodity
storage and marketing practices) may apply to some farms. but certainly not
to all farms. The same is true for the assumed crop and livestock production
coefficients and irrigation technologies. Because of these limitations. the
findings from the study--while based on the soundest analytic procedures that
we could find and further develop--should not be interpreted as absolutely
definitive.
We also realize that the applicability of the findings from the study to
individual RECs depends importantly on the cost structures and governing
philosophies of each REC.
We hope that this report and others prepared
through this research project ·will provide some useful insights to RECs as
they deal with the inherently multi-faceted and complex task of formulating
electric rate pricing policies for irrigation.
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APPENDIX
THE BASES FO

ESTABLISHING ELECTRIC RATE STRUCTURES
CLAY-UNION REc18

The purpose of this appendix is to provide an overview of the underlying
philosophy and procedures that the Clay-Union REC uses in establishing its
electric rates and rate structures for irrigation and other "rate classes"
(electric power consuming sectors).
The Clay-Union REC has five rate classes, namely, single phase (mainly
residential, accounting for 68.4% of REC revenue), large power (loads in excess
of 50 kVa of transformer capacity, 22.1% of revenue), irrigation (both single
and three-phase, 6.8% of revenue), commercial three-phase (up to 50 kVa, 1.5% of
revenues), and street lights (0.2% of revenue). To the maximum extent possible,
the REC establishes electric rate structures which result in each rate class
being fully self-supporting. In other words, deliberate efforts are exercised
to keep one rate class from subsidizing another.

..

In this appendix, attention is given to (1) the cost of service investment
analysis, undertaken annually by the Clay-Union REC, that represents the
"analytic backbone" for the establishment of the REC's electric rate structure,
(2) the process for and results from assigning the REC operating costs to the
various rate classes, and (3) the linkage between those cost assignments and the
development of the Clay-Union REC electric rate structure for irrigation for
1985.
Cost of service investaent analysis

A Cost of Service Study plays a key role in decisions on the electric rate
structure determined for each rate class. In the process of undertaking the
cost of service study, the costs of the REC's total electric plant are allocated
across the various rate classes. Both the fixed costs associated with the REC's
total electric plant investment and the variable operating costs--except the
wholesale costs of purchased electric power--are allocated in accordance with
the results of the cost of service investment analysis.
The cost of service methodology used by the Clay-Union REC is based on the
"minimum practical mile of line" concept.
The "minimum" investment costs per
mile for (1) poles, towers, fixtures, and overhead conductors and (2) underground conductors and devices are determined.
These per-mile costs are multiplied by the respective mileages of overhead and underground transmission lines
owned by the REC. The resulting "minimum practical mile of line" investment
costs are termed as "customer" distribution plant costs. The differences between the total actual distribution plant investment costs and the "customer"
18The sources of this appendix are a paper entitled The Modified Colorado
Concept, Cost of Service Study, Clay-Union and Union RECs, presented at Rate
Seminar-Cost of Service, Madison, South Dakota, April 30, 1985 and several
discussions during 1986 and 1987 between the authors and the Manager of
Clay-Union REC and two of the REC senior staff.
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costs are termed "capacity" distribution plant costs.
The "capacity" costs
represent plant investment to meet electric load requirements in excess of
"minimal" quantities of power and energy.19
The end-of-year depreciated inventory values for each component of the distribution plant investment are allocated in acco~gance with the above-described
respective "customer-capacity" investment ratios.
The subsequently determined
overall customer-capacity investment ratio for the entire distribution plant is
then used to allocate (1) the end-of-year depreciated inventory value for the
REC "general plant" (office buildings and equipment) and (2) selected operating
expenses.
namely. distribution facility operation and maintenance costs.
depreciation on investment (over 35 years for lines. transformers. and buildings
and 2 to 15 years for trucks. tools. and office equipment). taxes. and interest
on long-term debt. The other non-purchased electric power operating expenses
are allocated as follows. Meter reading. billing. and collection (termed "customer accounting") costs and "sales" costs are assigned totally to the "customer" category of expense. The administration and general office expense is
allocated in accordance with the overall customer-capacity ratio for all other
operating expenses.
Assign11ent of the REC operating costs to the various rate classes
The REC operating costs--inclusive of wholesale purchased electric power-can be portrayed in each of three contexts. The first two types of portrayal.
namely. according to accounting line item and type of electric cost. can be
prepared on the basis of the results of a cost of service investment analysis
and information on the wholesale purchased power costs.
The third type of
portrayal reflects the assignment of the REC operating costs to the various rate
classes.
In this section. the total operating expenses for the 1985 Cost of Service
Study for the Clay-Union REC are presented and discussed. They are initially
shown by accounting line item and type of electric cost. The procedures for assigning these costs to the various rate classes and the results of using the
procedure are then indicated.
Of the total operating expenses reported in the 1985 Cost of Service Study
for the Clay-Union REC. about 66% are accounted for by the electric power that
the REC purchases from the East River Electric Power Cooperative in Madison
(Appendix Table 1). The total demand charge is 50% greater than the total energy charge. Of the non-purchased electric power costs. the largest are for administration and general office (9.9% of the total operating costs). interest on
19 The investment in line transformers is handled in a somewhat analagous way.
The investment cost per "minimum size" transformer is multiplied by the actual
number of transformers owned by the REC to determine the "customer" assigned
transformer costs. The difference between the total actual REC investment in
transformers and the "customer" cost is termed the "capacity" component of the
total transformer investment.
20 The investments in "services". "meters". and "installations on consumer
premises" are assigned totally to the "customer" component of the distribution
plant costs.
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investment (8.0%). distribution facility operations and maintenance (7.1%). and
depreciation on investment (5.9%).
The REC total operat ]Jlg expenses presented in Appendix Table 1 are shown.
by type of electric cost. in Appendix Table 2. The demand charge represents
about 38% of the total. the energy charge 25%. the customer charge 21%. and the
capacity charge 16%. The procedures used for allocating these charges among the
various rate classes are now discussed.
The total REC demand. capacity. and energy charges are allocated to the
various rate classes on the basis of the following:
Demand: the contribution of each rate class to the total kilowatt (kW)
demand (coincidental) placed on the East River Power Cooperative through the
purchase of electric power by the Clay-Union REC:
Capacity: the contribution to the seasonal non-coincidental peak demand
of each rate class; and
Energy:

the actual kilowatt hour (kWh) usage by each rate class.

The allocation of the total customer charge among rate classes is according
to five individual components:
minimum mile of line (52% of the customer
costs). administration and general office (29%). billing and collections (12%).
meters and service entrance (6%). and meter reading (1%). These costs are allocated among rate classes on the basis of the following:
Mininmum mile of line: in direct
in each rate class;

proportion to the number of customers

Administration and general office:
earned by each rate class;

in direct proportion to the revenues

Meter reading:
the
respective rate classes; and
Other cost components:
tomer .numbers.

actual

average

via two

costs of reading

meters for the

different weighted proportions of cus-

Using these procedures. the Clay-Union REC operating costs are assigned to
rate classes as shown in Appendix Table 3. A generally similar pattern is shown
in the relative (percentage) breakdowns among the four type-of-electric-cost
categories for the various rate classes. The main exceptions to the general
pattern are (1) a much above-average relative importance of demand (kW) charges
for the irrigation and large power rate classes. which arises because of extreme
unevenness in the demand for power from month to month within the year for each
of these rate classes. and (2) a much below-average relative importance of customer charges for the large power rate class. which arises directly from the
"definition" of that rate class.

•

Further insights on inter-comparisons among rate classes can be derived
from the average allocated costs for the various rate classes shown in Appendix
Table 4. In the first part of this table are the average cost data. as reported
directly in the 1985 Cost of Service Study for the Clay-Union REC. The demand
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Appendix Table 1.

Clay-Union REC operating expenses, by
accounting line item.a

Expense category

Dollars

Purchased electric power
Demand charge
Energy charge
Capacity charge
Sub-total

1,406,961
939, 777
111,367
(2,458,105)

Other operating expenses
Administration and general office
Interest on investment
Distribution facility operations
and maintenance
Depreciation on investment
Customer accounting and sales
Taxes
Sub-total

Percent
37.9
25.3
3.0
(66.2)

365 ,640
297 ,640

GRAND TOTAL

9.9
8.0

264,050
219,600
100, 830
5,060
(1,252,820)

7.1
5.9
2.7
0.2
(33. 8)

3,710,925

100.0

•
Source:

1985 Cost of Service Study, p 12.

ain addition to these operating expenses, the REC is required
to provide for "margins" (ranging from 0.5 to 1.5 times as
much as their interest costs). These margins become capital
credits that are assigned back~over 15 to 20 years--to
cooperative members in proportion to their patronage of the
cooperative.

Appendix Table 2. Clay-Union REC operating
expenses, by type of electric cost.

Expense category

Dollars

Percent

Demand charge
Energy charge
Customer charge
Capacity charge
Street lights
Total

1,406,961
939,777
760,046
600, 796
3 1 345
3. 710, 925

37.9
25.3
20.5
16.2
0.1
100.0

Source:

1985 Cost of Service Study, p. 12.
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Appendix Table 3.

The Clay-Union REC assignment of operating costs to rate classes.a

Commercial
three phase
Dollars
Percent

Dollars

Percent

46.4
15.3
( 61. 7)

30.953
26.314
(57 .267)

34.1
29.0
( 63 .1)

1.406.961
939.777
(2.346. 738)

37.9
25.4
( 63.3)

38.579
57.676
(96.255)

15.4
22.9
( 38.3)

16.145
17.423
(33.568)

17.7
19.2
( 36. 9)

760.046
600. 796
(1.360.842)

20.5
16.2
( 36.7)

251.564

100.0

90.835

100.0

3.710.925

100.0

Single phase
Percent
DQllu:s

Large power
Dollars
Percent

Irrigation
Dollars
Percent

Electric energy costs
Demand (kW) charge
Energy (kWh) charge
Sub-total

7 80. 863
680.398
(1. 461. 261)

30.7
26 .8
( 57.5)

476.960
192.654
(669.614)

58.2
23.5
( 81. 7)

116.778
38.531
(155.309)

Plant-related costs
Customer charges
Capacity charges
Sub-total

688.398
391.118
(1.079.516)

27 .1
15.4
( 42 . 5)

16.610
133.377
(149.987)

2.0
16.3
( 18.3)

2.540. 777

100.0

819.601

100.0

GRAND TOTAL

Total

b

0\

w

Source:

1985 Cost of Service Study. p. 7.

aThe actually-used assigned operating costs for establishing the electric rate structures for the various rate classes differ
slightly (about 1%) from the "Grand Totals" shown below. Adjustments are first made for gross revenue taxes. current margins.
deferred margins. and other limited purposes.
bThe total column includes. in addition to the costs for the four rate clases shown in the table. $3.345 of street light-relat e
costs.

(kW) and energy (kWh) charges are very similar among rate classes. The
plant-related costs per customer are expectedly below-average for the numerous
(2.647) single phase customers and above-average for the customers constituting
the other rate classes (only 35 to 87 customers per rate class).
The point of greatest difference among rate classes. however. concerns the
capacity charge. This charge per kWh of power use for irrigation is 2.3 times
as great as the average for all rate classes for the RECs (2.89 versus 1.26
cents per kWh).
This cost phenomenon arises because of a disproportionately
large contribution of irrigation to the REC's seasonal non-coincidental peak
demand for electric power.
In the second part of Appendix Table 4. the data for the various rate
classes are standardized across the type-of-electric-cost categories on the
basis of average per kWh costs. In other words. no matter what the nature of
the type of electric cost. the total expense for it is divided by the kWh use
projected in the 1985 Cost of Service Study for the respective rate classes.
The most striking contrast shown is a 60% above-average cost for the
electric power used for irrigation (12.6 versus 7.8 cents per kWh). The overall
electric cost per kWh for irrigation is high because the demand charge per kWh
for irrigation is twice the average (5.85 versus 2.96 cents per kWh) and the
plant-related costs are 70% above-average (4.82 versus 2.86 cents per kWh).
These above-average costs for irrigation reflect (1) above-average electric distribution plant costs associated with the relative remoteness of location for
irrigators and (2) the relatively limited volume of kWh usage compared to the
peak kW demand requirement associated with irrigation pumping that is "energyintensive". on the one hand. and limited to only a small part of the year. on
the other hand. The latter feature precludes the spreading of fixed annual customer and capacity charges across large numbers of kWhs.
Establishaent of the electric rate structure for irrigation

The electric rate structure for irrigation for the Clay-Union REC has evolved from year to year during the 1980s based on (1) reviews of experience with
prior rate structures by the management and governing board of the REC and (2)
preferences expressed by irrigators concerning possible changes in electric rate
structures.
These changes involve both the nature of the electric rate structure and the within-season timing of payments for the customer and capacity (or
"facilities") charge.
For example. several years ago the entire facilities charge for Clay-Union
REC irrigators was due at the beginning of the irrigation season. A change was
then made that permitted the facilities charge to be paid at the end of the
season. with provision for the potential offsetting of part of an irrigator's
facilities charge by his energy (kWh) charge.
More recently. in response to a quite commonly held preference by irrigators. two changes were made. To simplify understanding by irrigators of the
rationale for the electric rate structure for irrigation. a decision was made to
(1) load the entire REC facilities charge into the "annual minimum" charge and
(2) essentially pass through to irrigators the wholesale demand (kW) and energy
(kWh) charges paid to the East River Cooperative. along with necessary margins.
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Appendix Table 4.

Clay-Union REC. average allocated costs. by rate class.

Average cost
Electric energy
Demand ($ per kW)
Energy (cents per kWh)
Plant-related
Customer ($ per year)
Capacity (cents per kWh)

0\

\J1

Single-Ehase

Large Eower

Irrigation

Commercial
three Ehase

All rates
classes

10.52
1.95

10.55
1.95

10.53
1.93

10.46
1.99

10.65
1.97

257 .08
1.12

470. 80
1.35

43 8.56
2.89

380.10
1.32

270.09
1.26

Standardized average per-kWh cost (cents)
Electric energy
Demand
2.24
Energy
1.95
( 4.19)
Sub-total
Plant-related
Customer
1.97
Capacity
1.12
( 3 .09)
Sub-total
GRAND TOTAL
Source:

..

•

7.28

(

4.84
1.95
6. 79)

(

0.17
1.35
1.52)
8.31

Adapted from 1985 Cost of Services Study. pp. 3-7 and 11.

(

5.85
1.93
7. 78)

(

1.93
2.89
4.82)
12.60

(

2.34
1.99
4.33)

(

1.22
1.32
2.54)
6.87

(

2.96
1.97
4.93)

(

1.60
1.26
2.86)
7 .79

The second change was to allow the annual minimum payment to be paid in three
. equal installments on July 15th. August 15th. and September 15th.
Within this guiding . perspective. we now examine the linkage between the
above assignment of REC operating costs to the irrigation rate class and the
electric rate structure for irrigation that was established in 1985.
1. The annual aini.aaa payment represents the dollar charge per average
kW for each irrigation service.
It covers the full REC facilities (plantrelated customer and capacity) charge for ir!fgation. which in the 1985 Cost of
Service Study is $38 0 155 + $57 0 033 = $95.188.
The total horsepower represented by the electric motors energizing the pumps of the REC's irrigators in 1985
is 6 0 000. which is equivalent to 5.348 kW. Through dividing $95.188 by 5.348.
the annual minimum of $17.80 per average kW is determined.
2. The aonthly deaand payment charge assessed against irrigators is
directly linked with the wholesale month;! demand payment from the Clay-Union
REC to the East River Power Cooperative.
The total wholesale monthly demand
payment for irrigation in the 1985 Cost of Service Study is $115 0 460. The total
kW demand over the irrigation season for the 87 irrigators is 10.960. The
quotient associated with these two figures is $10.53 per kW. ·
The actual monthly demand payment in the 1985 rate structure for irrigation
is $9.00 per kW per month. A demand charge somewhat less than $10.53 per kW per
month was chosen for an interim period. to reduce the magnitude of one-time adjustment from the prior year's charge of $7.80 per kW per month.
3. The energy (kWh) payment for irrigation is also directly linked with
the wholesale energy (kWh) charge from the Clay-Union REC to East River. 23 The
total energy allocation for irrigation in the 1985 Cost of Service Study of
$38 0 100 was divided by the projected kWh usage of 1.975.000 to obtain an average
cost of 1.93 cents per kWh for irrigation energy.

•

The energy (kWh) charge in the 1985 electric rate structure for irrigation
is two-stepped. with the costs for the first 100 kWh per kW per season at 4.2
cents per kWh and all additional kWh at 2.6 cents per kWh. These rates are
higher than 1.93 cents per kWh to offset the $1.50 per kW shortfall in the
monthly demand charge and provide a "cushion" to meet the "margin" requirement
of the REC. The energy (kWh) charge is two-stepped. rather than single-stepped.
to facilitate the meeting of the monthly demand shortfall. on the one hand. and
encourage greater electric power usage. on the other.
21 These figures and those that follCIW are taken from Appendix Table 3. with
slight modifications to conform with the first footnote to the table. The
monthly demand (kWh) and energy (kWh) costs emerging from the Cost of Service
Study are also shown in Appendix Table 5.
22 rn principle. the monthly demand charge represents the payment for the
electric power generation and transmission facilities required to meet an REC's
electric power supply needs at any given time.
23 rn principle. the energy charge--based on kWh of consumption--represents the
payment for the resources used in generating electricity.
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